An Investigation Into The Meaning Of The Term ‘UNITED STATES
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Table of contents

1.  Preliminary remarks on the different meanings of ‘United States’
2.  Another 'United States of America’
3.  The territorial, federal, District, corporate ‘States’ or 'United States’
4.  ‘Person’
5.  ‘Individual’
6.  ‘The 50 States’ - ‘the several States’ and ‘the federal States’
7.  ‘State’
8.  The Hawaii Omnibus Act
9.  A few general remarks
10.  Corporate entities
11.  The value of one’s labor
12.  Taxpayer’s IMF indicates that s/he is a business
13.  ‘Nonresident alien’
14.  The Brushaber case
15.  A brief interlude on the plain meaning rule
16.  ‘U.S. residents’ and ‘state Citizens’
17.  ‘Resident alien’ - ‘reside’ - ‘domicile’ and more on ‘resident’
18.  The Buck Act and its ‘Federal areas’
19.  ‘Includes’ and more on ‘resident’
20.  Jurisdiction and more on ‘State’
21.  More on ‘resident’ and ‘nonresident’
22.  Private international law
23.  ‘Tax payer’ - ‘taxpayer’ and ‘nontaxpayer’
24.  More on ‘foreign earned income’ and Form 2555
25.  Duties of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID)
26.  Implementing regulations
27.  Status, ‘person’ and ‘individual’
28.  Conclusion and a note on the ‘861 argument’
Quotations
Appendix: Treasury Decision 2313

Introduction and warning

My primary objective in this investigation is to provide a sketch of some of the meanings of the term 'United States,' and scrutinize how the general misinterpretation of this key term, and others, has led to the incorrect deciphering of the Internal Revenue Code—which has prompted most Americans to falsely believe that they have always had some legal obligation to fill out a Form W-4, to file a return, and to pay income tax—although I do stray from this point considerably, in addressing tax and other matters. But basic is defining the ‘United States.’

I can not stress too strongly that despite the many aspects of tax law that are dealt with,
it was never my intent to provide tools, in any manner, for confronting the IRS. Preparation for such interfacing requires exacting knowledge of proper strategies and procedure , to which I do not even allude. That is a whole other area of study, which I cannot adequately go into here. At times, an ingenuous scribbled reply has prevailed, in a response to a request for an overdue tax return (CP-515 to 518)…but don’t count on it! And, if you think merely quoting some law, or regulation, or interpretation of facts will do the trick, please restrain yourself.

This is, rather, a diligent inquiry into the true nature of the matters examined, and nothing in this paper should be construed as legal advice. I am only presenting the results of my research, based on the codes, statutes, court cases, government manuals, directives, Treasury Orders, etc. —all of which are referenced and, usually, quoted in pertinent part. I apologize for any undocumented statement that I might have carelessly made. Ignore it.

By the end of this paper, I hope to have proven to your complete satisfaction that the government, being constitutionally constrained, as it is, was really not able to do a thorough job of encrypting its code—for almost everything has to be, by law, and is, spelled out. Therefore, those who are sufficiently pertinacious, and have unbiased eyes to see, can eventually arrive at an adequately clear picture. But, once again, this a theoretical examination of certain topics, and not an attempt to suggest any course of action in confronting the IRS. 

As a matter of fact, with one notable exception, strategies that successfully deal with the IRS have no need to employ the interpretation espoused in this paper, viz. that when the Internal Revenue Code, uses the term ‘United States,’ except where it specifies otherwise, refers only to the federal States , such as the District of Columbia, Guam, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, etc., and federal possessions and enclaves—in other words, what I will often refer to as the federal zone. To take one of many examples, if one were to simply ask the IRS for the section in the code that required her/him to file a return and obligated him/her to pay income tax, the definition of ‘United States' would, obviously, be utterly irrelevant.

There is, as mentioned, one strategy that does employ this knowledge. I only call attention to it because for a quarter of a century it has enabled thousands of knowledgeable Americans to be reclassified to the status of one not obligated to pay income tax— and this speaks volumes as to the veracity of the explication in this paper of the term ‘United States,’ as used in the IRC. Because this strategy rests entirely on this interpretation. In a word, it involves the proper utilization of IRC § 6013(g)(4) Termination of election (A) Revocation by taxpayers, which I comment on pages 10, and especially page 46.


AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MEANING
OF THE TERM ‘UNITED STATES’

TOGETHER WITH SOME OTHER RELATED TERMS
AND SELECTED MATTERS HAVING
TO DO WITH TAXATION

 

I doubt if many Americans have ever given a second thought to the meaning of the term ‘United States,’ or would believe that it could be a perplexing question. It would have my vote, however, as being by far the most important and controversial ‘word (or term) of art,’ vocabula artis—also referred to as a ‘statute term,’ ‘leading word (or term),’ or what the French call parol de ley,technical word of law—in all American legal writings…as well as the most dangerous. For it is ambivalent, equivocal, and ambiguous. Indeed, as you will see, its use in the law exemplifies ‘patent ambiguity,’ which is defined as:

An ambiguity apparent on face of instrument [sic] and arising by reason of any inconsistency or inherent uncertainty of language used so that effect is either to convey no definite meaning or confused meaning. (Black’s Law Dictionary,6thedition. Emphasis added.)

Reading Hamlet in the park this afternoon, I chanced on to an intriguing way to put it. In the words of King Claudius:

The harlot’s cheek, beautified with plast’ring art,
Is not more ugly to the thing that helps it
Than is my deed to my most painted word .
O heavy burden! (III, I, 51-54. Emphasis added.)

The editor, Harold Jenkins, in his notes on ‘painted’ says: "…fair but false in appearance, like the beauty of the painted cheek." What serendipity to find this, just as I am on my final proofing of this paper. It is so appropriate, to describe how 'United States' usually is used by the government. And it has indeed imposed on us all a ‘heavy burden’!

With dogged determination and perseverance, however, one can succeed in seeing through this meticulous and painstakingly contrived duplicity. For, fortunately, Congress must define all terms that it uses in a particular and special way. For example, in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), chapter 79 Definitions , Section 7701 Definitions , it states: "(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof…" It goes on, then, to define many ‘terms of art.’ These definitions apply throughout the code, "where not otherwise distinctly expressed"—which will sometimes be done for a single chapter, section, subsection, or even sentence …which, you will later see, can be very instructive.

I fear that such analysis can be tedious, and for this I apologize. I will try to be as pithy and compendious as possible, but I am not writing merely to express opinions; I am writing to prove the points I discuss. And I will worry a question like a bull dog, until I am satisfied that I have presented enough hard data to conclusively establish my particular contention, especially in the eyes of those of a different persuasion. For there are intelligent and respected researchers, for whom I have the greatest regard, who do not agree, for example, with my interpretation of the meaning of 'United States' in Title 26, as well as in all the other titles.

The history of the usage of ‘United States’ from the time of the American colonies to the present, is remarkably complex. This is thoroughly investigated in an easy-reading yet scholarly book that I highly recommend, by Sebastian de Gracia, A Country With No Name, Pantheon, 1997. Herein, however, I will have occasion to avail myself of virtually nothing from this wonderful tome. When I think of this, it astonishes even me. But my focus is primarily on the relevance of this term as it relates to the law, especially tax law, to which he simply doesn’t allude…at least in the way I do.

Before getting started, let me give you just a hint as to why it is so extremely important to have an absolutely correct interpretation of the term ‘United States,’ but also, in the two quotes below, ‘nonresident alien,’ and ‘gross income.’

This preview is an important section from the IRC, which is Title 26, also written in cites as ‘26 United States Code’ or ‘26 USC’ Section (the symbol § or, often, as in this paper, these are omitted) 

872 Gross income :

(a) General rule. In the case of a nonresident alien individual…gross income includes only—(1) gross income which is derived from sources within the United States and which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States, and (2) gross income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States

Add to this 26 USC 7701(b)(1)(B):

An individual is a nonresident alien if such individual is neither a citizen of the United States nor a resident of the United States…

and I think you will agree that the cardinal conundrum here—indeed the very crux—is the determination as to what is meant by the term "United States" — and, above, ‘nonresident alien.’ For, under certain circumstances we see that the nonresident alien is not subject to any federal income tax—if his relationship to the ‘United States’ is of a certain nature.

The ‘United States’ is an abstraction given substantiality when delegated duties began to be performed, and when 1:8:17 of the Constitution was implemented, which provided for land for the seat of government, as well as forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. Upon thus acquiring land, it also became a geographical entity, as well as a government.

To begin with, one must remember, as the Supreme Court said, "the term United States is a metaphor." (A figure of speech. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122. Note that ‘U.S.’ in a cite like this indicates the U.S. Supreme Court.) The philosopher Jose Ortega y Gassett believes that "[t]he metaphor is perhaps one of man’s most fruitful potentialities. Its efficacy verges on magic." But beware, there is black magic as well as white magic. In other words, as Lakoff and Johnson point out in Metaphors We Live By, metaphors can create reality for us, and can become symbols that "structure our conceptual system." That is, they can impede the clarity of our thinking. For, as you will see, there are numerous meanings of the term ‘United States,’ though the government seeks to obscure this.

In the following section, you will see that you should develop the habit of always asking both yourself, and those who speak to you of it, WHICH United States? O.K., let us begin our Odyssey.


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1. Preliminary remarks on the different meanings of ‘United States.’

The lengthy insular cases were settled in 1901, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244. In the latter, Justice Harlan dissented with the following words:

The idea prevails with some—indeed, it found expression in arguments at the bar that we have in this country substantially or practically two national governments; one, to be maintained under the Constitution, with all its restrictions; the other to be maintained by Congress outside and independently of that instrument, by exercising such powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to exercise. (at 380)

Balzac v. Porto  (sic) Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)reaffirmed (at 305) that the United States, under 4:3:2 of the Constitution, has exclusive power over the territories outside the union states. It is in no way bound, in its municipal laws, by what Jefferson called the chains of the Constitution. But, also the reverse applies:

…criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts is restricted to federal reservations over which the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction as well as to [federal] forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, or other needful buildings. 18 USC 451(3)(d). [Emphasis added.]

It is autonomous within the areas over which it has complete legislative jurisdiction—the District of Columbia, Guam and the other federal or territorial States and enclaves, etc. The ‘citizens of the U.S.,’ (in this paper lower case ‘c’ indicates a federal citizen) residing therein, are given ‘civil rights,’ i.e., statutory and, therefore, retractable privileges . They do not have the u nalienable rights of state Citizens. In brief, Daniel Webster was ultimately ruled to be right: "The Constitution was made for the states, not the territories."

Two years after the 14thArticle of Amendment to the Constitution was said to have been ratified, this very interesting decision was promulgated by the California Supreme Court:

I have no doubt that those born in the Territories, or in the District of Columbia, are so far citizens as to entitle them to the protection guaranteed to citizens of the United States in the Constitution, and to the shield of nationality abroad; but it is evident that they have not the political rights which are vested in citizens of the [s]tates. They are not constituents of any community in which is vested any sovereign power of government. Their position partakes more of the character of subjects than of citizens . They are subject to the laws of the [federal] United States, but have no voice in its management. If they are allowed to make laws, the validity of these laws is derived from the sanction of Government in which they are not represented. Mere citizenship they may have, but the political rights of [C]itizens they cannot enjoy until they are organized into a State, and admitted into the [u]nion. People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 342 [1870]. [Emphasis added.]

Of course, the creation of ‘citizens of the United States’ dates back to July 9, 1868, when the 14thArticle of Amendment was fraudulently declared to be ratified. (Please allow me to remind you of the oft-quoted statement by judge Ellett, of the Utah Supreme Court: "I cannot believe that any court, in full possession of its faculties, could honestly hold that the amendment was properly approved and adopted." State v. Phillips, Pacific Reporter, 2ndSeries, Vol. 540, page 941-942 (1975).

I must point out that the wording in the 14thAmendment reveals something very important. For it speaks of "c itizens of the United States" and "c itizens of the state wherein they reside." This is the first time that ‘citizen’ was not capitalized. Henceforth, lower case usage indicates a federal government subject, termed a ‘U.S. citizen.’ Not, be it noted, a citizen of any ‘land’ or country, but, as the courts have ruled, of a government. U.S. citizens are government citizens --which, as you will see, is exceedingly significant. State Citizens are free wo/men on the land.

The first clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution…created two classes of citizens, one of the United States and the other of the state. Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 427, 17 Am. Rep. 738.

There are, then, two classes of citizens; one of the United States, and one of the state. One class of citizenship may exist in a person without the other, as in the case of a resident of the District of Columbia. Gardina v. Board of Registrars of Jefferson County, 48 So. 788, 790, 791, 160 Ala. 155.

In the second sentence of the 14thArticle of Amendment of the Constitution of the United States it says: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States…" [Emphasis added.] Seven years later, the Supreme Court made the distinction crystal clear:

We have in our political system a government of the United States and a government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 588m 590 (1875)

In 1945, the Supreme Court settled this once and for all in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652—indeed, saying that they wouldn’t deal with it again; henceforth, it must simply be given judicial notice. They upheld the Downes v. Bidwellcase, above, but now GAVE THREE MEANINGS TO THE TERM ‘UNITED STATES.’ (at 671-672) In the instant paper, the primary meaning of "United States" will be that designating territory over which the sovereignty of the corporate United States extends—as granted to this federal agency (i.e., creation) of the union states, under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17, and Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2, of their Constitution forthe United States of (i.e., belonging to or originating from) America. The other two meanings designated are a nation among the family of nations, as at the UN, and the collective name of the states united by and under the Constitution (in this case, not including the District of Columbia, etc.). In other words, "the [s]tates united," as it was worded in People v. De Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870). Especially the last of these three, is often referred to as the United States of America.


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2. Another ‘United States of America.’

    In January, 1997, Dan Meador and Tim McCrory "tracked down the illusive "United States of America" named principal in all current Federal civil and criminal prosecution. The new entity is a coalition of Federal territories and insular possessions, it is not

    [s]tates of the [u]nion." (Internet email-list communication, "Who are IRS & the USA?" of June 15, 2000, by Dan Meador.) They demonstrate the use by the federal government, itself, of the term of art ‘the United States of America .’ If proof were not so incontrovertible—you can look up for yourself—one would dismiss this as a fantastical notion, or a meaningless slip.

    Article I of the Articles of Confederation (1777) used the phrase "United States of America." Sometime after 1909 the federal government began using this term, to refer to an agency of the ‘United States.’ One reads on the Federal Reserve Note that it is "legal tender for all debts, public and private, in the United States of America." Given that the Federal Reserve Act was enacted as a municipal law of the District of Columbia (and, therefore, by the way, perfectly constitutional), it isn’t difficult to figure out that the District of Columbia could be at least part of what is referred to as the ‘U.S.A.’

    On December 7, 1925 Congress set forth 50 titles, "intended to embrace the laws of the United States…" and yet these titles were designated "the Code of the Laws of the United States of America ." (Emphasis added. Today there are only 48 titles, since Title 34 Navy has been eliminated, by the enactment of Title 10 Armed Forces , and Title 6 Surety Bonds was repealed, with the enactment of Title 31 Money and Finance . But, you still will always read "the 50 Titles.")

    The U.S. Constitution, of course,only delegates authority to the "United States," not the "United States of America." The United States is an agency of the U.S.A.—not the other way around. The first sentence of Article I states: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which…" Article II, Section 1 speaks of "the Government of the United States." And Article III, Section 1 begins: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall…"

    The distinctness of these two entities is incontestably made evident in the 1934 edition of The Code of the Laws of the United States of America, Title18 § 80. (Criminal Code,

    § 35, amended.) Presenting false claims.

    Whoever shall make or cause to be made or present or cause to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, or any department thereof, or any corporation in which the United States of America is astockholder , any claim upon or against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, or any corporation in which the United States of America is astockholder , knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent; or whoever shall by any trick, scheme, or device a [sic] material fact, or statements or representations, or make or use or cause to be made or used any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency or the United States or of any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder shall be fined not more than $10,000 or… (Emphasis added. A stockholder?!?!)

    Or, also, 28 CFR § 0.96(b) Exchange of prisoners :

    The Director of the Bureau of Prisons and officers of the Bureau of Prisons designated by him are authorized to receive custody of offenders and to transfer offenders to and from the United States of America UNDER TREATY as referred to in Public Law 95-144; to make arrangements with the States and to receive offenders from the [federal] States for transfer to a foreign country [such as Ohio] to act as an agent of the United States to receive the delivery from a foreign government [say, Vermont] of any person being transferred to the United States under such a treaty

    This makes unmistakable the fact that two independent and discrete geographical jurisdictions, foreign to one anotherAND UNDER TREATY WITH EACH OTHER , are being referred to. Furthermore, 18 USC § 1001 historical notes, together with § 6, unassailably prove that the United States of Americais a creation, an instrumentality, an agency of the United States, and/or a political subdivision thereof.  It could be the District of Columbia and/or a compact of the insular possessions of the U.S., subject to the territorial clause at 4:3:2 of the Constitution. Indeed, I like Dan Meador’s idea that it might better be described as the ‘Federal United States of America’ —which distinguishes it from the Preamble U.S.A.

    In the historical notes to the current 18 USC § 1001 we find:

    Words "or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder" in said § 80 [of the 1940 ed. of the USC] were omitted as unnecessary in view of definition of "agency " in§ 6of this title. [Emphasis added.]

    Section 6 says:

    The term "agency" includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest

    All of this recalls to mind the Declaration of Independence of 1776:

    He [King George] has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended legislation….altering fundamentally the Forms of our Government…

    Unaware of this shattering state of affairs, many people include "of America," in their speech and writings, in an effort to avoid all ambiguity—as indeed the federal government does itself, in an extremely noteworthy and striking example. It involves the wording of the two perjury jurats, found in Title 28 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Section 1746:

    (1) If executed without (outside) the [federal] United States: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)" [Emphasis added.]

    (2) If executed within the [federal] United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)" [Emphasis added.]

    "If executed without the United States…" doesn’t mean in Moscow; it means any place in the 50 union states that is not a federal zone, like D.C., an airforce base, or Guam. It would have been possible to include in (2) "under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States,"—leaving out ‘of America’—but that would have got people thinking about the difference between the U.S. and the U.S. of A….and that maybe they were swearing under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction!

    They are , of course, but it is a particular kind of law; it is special, private, corporate, contract law—with the 27 non-positive law titles of the 48, which are the corporate bylaws, having little or no necessary legal force and effect on the general populationUNLESS there is some legal adhesionment, like signing a 1040 Label Form. (The term ‘label’ is on the form, some say, because you are affixing your ‘seal.’)

    The jurat on this form does not exactly follow the wording of 28 USC 1746(2), above, as some people seem to think. The Form 1040 says "Under penalties of perjury, I declare…" The reason for this dissimilarity is because a federal employee or official may be tried and penalized twice. The second penalty is loss of benefits for life, if impeached and convicted…because of having taken an oath of office. Remember, an oath establishes jurisdiction…indeed, the word means ‘oath spoken.’ For example, even though you haven’t filed a tax return for decades, the government will ‘presume’ that you still believe yourself to have a duty to do so—unless you have rebutted this presumption by a cancellation of the oath you took on signing your first Form 1040 jurat—see 26 USC 6013(g)(4) Termination of election (A) Revocation by taxpayers.

    By claiming to be a U.S. citizen, for tax purposes, way back when you were 14, you became, in the eyes of the IRS, a ‘federal person ,’ a de jure (by oath) non-compensated federal employee. For after all, jurato creditur in judicio, he who swears an oath is to be believed in judicial proceedings.

    And you can now commit yourself to this jurat on-line. That is, once you have declared yourself to be a taxpayer under penalty of perjury on Form 8453-OL, and mailed it to the IRS. (On-line signatures permitted after October, 2000.) Thereafter, using the Declaration Control Number (DCN) they provide, all your 1040s or 1099s are considered to be signed under oath. And, for your convenience, this authorizes access to you bank account or credit card for direct withdrawal. How thoughtful! Thirty three million DCNs were provided last year. They are aiming at 80% of all tax returns to be filed electronically, by 2007.

    I can’t recall any criminal prosecution involving federal income taxation where there was not a signed tax form in evidence, or referred to…albeit of many years previous. And, the judge will say openly—but mostly to deaf ears—that if you don’t disavow (un-swear) that you are a ‘United States person’ (26 USC § 7701(a)(30) ) you can be found guilty of failure to file.

    Unless the defendant can establish that he is not a citizen of the [District] United States , the IRS possesses authority to attempt to determine his federal tax liability.
    U.S. v. Slater, 82-2 USTC 9571. [Emphasis added.]

    As Templeton does not dispute that she is a citizen of the [District] United States , and because the Code imposes an income tax on ‘every individual who is a citizen or resident of the [District] United States,’ 26 CFR 1.1-(1)(a), it would clearly contradict the ‘plain meaning’ [see section 14, below, by that title] of the term to conclude that Congress did not intend that Templeton be considered a ‘taxpayer’ as the term is used throughout the Code. Rachel Templeton v. IRS, 86-1363 on appeal from 85 c 457. [Emphasis added.]

    For, every federal indentured servant, subject, slave, ‘individual,’ ‘employee,’ and ‘official’ has an undisputed duty to file a tax return…being a homo fiscalis, ‘a vassal belonging to the treasury’ —being an alieni juris,one under the control of, or subject to the authority of, another…opposite to a freeman in sui juris,one possessing all his natural, social, and civil rights, not under anyone else’s guardianship or control. In other words, s/he is capax negotii, competent to transact his or her legal affairs. Or, one could say, one who has rectus in curia, right in court, one who can benefit from the law—unlike the ‘outlaw’ or slave. That is, legally being able to act for him/herself …namely, having the legal capacity, ability, and power to manage his/her own affairs, as opposed to someone having relinquished his/her power of judicial action, by giving up his/her power of attorney, and becoming, thereby, a ‘ward of the court.’ That is, someone considered of unsound mind and under the care of a guardian.

    Truly unbelievable! One is reminded of a remark by Judge Bork, to the effect that 90% of those in prison are there voluntarily—i.e., by consent and permission! (You notice that he was not confirmed as a Supreme Court Justice!) Which brings to mind a Supreme Court case, in 1794, where one reads that:

    The only reason, I believe, that a free man is bound by human law, is, that he binds himself. Chisholm v, Georgia, 2, Dall 440, 455.

    Before leaving discussion of the semi-statutory ‘U.S.A.’ —I say ‘semi’ because it was never enacted into actual law, just treated as though it were a fait accompli, a done deal, and never discussed. There is a great deal to be said about this subject; however, I will keep it short. Interested parties must go to Dan Meador’s most recent writings for a more full treatment—for example "Agents of a Foreign Government: A Bizarre Saga," written April 5, 2000.

    I am going to skip over the very important relationship of the IRS with its predecessor, the BIR (Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico), starting back in 1900. Here, as briefly as possible, I am going to touch on two very recent monumentally important events.

    The first dates to January 24, 2000, where United States Attorney, Betty H. Richardson, responded to a complaint for impleader by the attorney John M. Ohman, for Cox Ohman & Brandstetter, Chartered, "in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville Magistrates Court" (Case No. CV93-4117). The point is that Ms. Richardson responded to the 4thitem of the complaint with the earth-shocking statement that—and I have a court copy in front of me: "4. Denies that the Internal Revenue Service is an agency of the United States Government [,] but admits that the United States OF AMERICA would be a proper party to this action …." [Emphasis added.]I agree with Dan Meador that: "The Internal Revenue Service operates as an agent of this come-lately geographical and political alliance know[n] as the United States of America , Puerto Rico being a party to the compact" …though there hasn’t been space enough here to properly substantiate that statement. This is but a sketch.

    In boxing they speak of the ‘one, two punch’. Well, here is the second punch …the coup de grace; Michael Bufkin sent a FOIA request on December 18, 1998 to the Department of the Treasury, "for documents that evidence the authority of the U.S. Attorney General’s Office to defend IRS agents in a civil or criminal matter." This is a quote from the government’s response, on August 2, 1999: "A search was performed with the Office of Tax Crimes (Criminal Investigation) and with the Assistant Chief Counsel (Disclosure Litigation) and we have no documents responsive to your request." [Emphasis added.]

    He then sent a FOIA request to the U.S. Department of Justice (Criminal Division), on September 21, 1999, and received a reply on January 11, 2000, stating that "we did not locate any records responsive to your request …" [Emphasis added.] from the Chief FOIA/Privacy Act Unit Office of Enforcement Operations Criminal Division.

    This is staggering in its implications!… or, perhaps ‘indications ’—for it doesn’t imply anything; it clearly states in black and white: the United States Government has no authority to defend in court any employee of the IRS… for they are not employees of the U.S. Government!!

    So, there we have it. The latest ‘cutting edge news’ …the IRS is not, in the strict governmental sense of the term, an ‘agency’ —though it is hired out by the government, like a janitorial service. So there is not anything inconsistent with the fact that they get checks from the Department of Treasury. Just as the company that paints one of their buildings or repairs their toilets. It means nothing, where the check comes from.


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3. The territorial, federal, District, corporate ‘States’ or ‘United States'

In this paper, I will often qualify ‘United States’ and ‘State’ by placing in brackets before them one or more of the following: territorial, federal, District, or corporate. I realize that these words are not synonymous, but I often use the first one that comes to mind…except, sometimes, to make a slightly different stress, in a particular context. I do this to point out the distinctness of the particular use of ‘U.S.,’ in the given quotation, from the common understanding of its meaning, as standing for the whole nation of the 50 states, together with the federal zone.

In case anyone has trouble with considering the ‘U.S.’ a corporation, s/he will find this case, decided in 1823, of interest:

The United States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate…This great corporation was ordained and established by the American people… (United States v. Maurice, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15, 747, 2 Brock 96, Circuit Court, D. Virginia)

Also, in the Clearfield case, of 1943, the Supreme Court quotes the very early Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall 55, where it was stated that "[g]overnments are corporations."

The Corpus Juris Secundum § 2 states:

When the United States enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. [Emphasis added.]

But, more current and interesting is the cite from 28 USC 3002, which states that ‘United States’ has several other meanings, as well:

 

(15) ''United States'' means—

(A) a Federal corporation ;

(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United

States; or

(C) an instrumentality of the United States. [Emphasis added.]

As for ‘territory’:

[It’s] a part of the country separated from the rest and subject to a particular jurisdiction . A portion of the country subject to and belonging to the [District] United States [Government] which is not within the boundary of any state or the District of Columbia. (262 U.S. 122. Emphasis added.)

A territory is not a sovereignty. Such legislative powers as it may possess are delegated powers which may be granted or withheld at the will of Congress." Territory v. Alexander, 11 Ariz. 172, 89 P. 514 (1907).


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4. ‘Person.’

I have used the term ‘person ’ a number of times, and I believe it deserves some special attention. It derives from the Latin ‘persona,’ an actor’s mask, used in Greek and Roman times for two purposes…to identify the stage character—for one actor often played more than one role, so he would simply switch masks—and to project his voice by means of a megaphone-shaped mouth…per sona, by sound. Hence, our word ‘personality,’ that about ourselves which we project to others. In some, more than others, a presentation that indeed masks our true character or nature. In the Middle Ages it came to be used as synonymous with ‘homo,’ man or individual. This was not the case in ancient (and modern) Roman law. As one legal historian put it:

jus personarum did not mean law of persons, or rights of persons, but law of status, or condition. A person is here not a physical or individual person, but the status or condition with which he is invested . (34 Austins Jur., 363. Emphasis added.)

In the 15thcentury, "person came to be used in legal terminology for one (as a human being, a partnership, or a corporation) that is recognized by the law as the subject of rights and duties. " (Merriam-Webster’s New Book of Word Histories, 1991. Emphasis added.) Note here that it is only the ‘human being’ in his person, as a subject of rights and duties. As Ortolan says, in his History of the Roman Law:

The word ‘person (persona) does not in the language of the law, as in ordinary language, designate the physical man . In the first, it is every being considered as capable of having or owing rights, of being the active or passive subject of rights.

We say every being, for men are not alone comprised therein. In fact, law by its power of abstraction creates persons ….because it makes of them beings capable of having or owing rights….

We shall therefore have to discriminate between, and to study, two classes of person: physical or natural persons, for which we find no distinctive denomination in Roman jurisprudence …; that is to say, the man-person; and abstract persons, which are fictitious and which have no existence except in law; that is to say, those which are purely legal conceptions or creations.

In another sense, very frequently employed, the word ‘person’ designates each character man is called upon to play on the judicial stage; that is to say, each quality which gives him certain rights or certain obligations —for instance, the person of father; of son as subject to his father; of husband or guardian. In this sense the same man can have several personae at the same time. [Emphasis added.]

The Internal Revenue Code is Roman or civil law, together with its sibling, maritime or admiralty law . Thus, as I discuss below, the Supreme Court clearly states that all income taxes are on corporations, as set forth in the Corporation Tax Act of 1909, not on people . That is why all 48 titles always speak of persons, never people, human beings, or men or women ; a fiction can only deal with a fiction.

This was made clear even before the Constitution, in The Federalist Papers, No. 15:

Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to raise either by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. [Emphasis added.]

Let me put a little flesh on these bones. The Supreme Court stated in Edwards v. Cuba RR Co., 268 US 628 that:

…the meaning of ‘income’ as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Law of 1909 is not to be distinguished from the meaning of the same word as used in the Income Tax Law of 1913 and the Revenue Act of 1916. Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka 255 US 509. [Emphasis added.]

However, as pointed out by Kenneth Weiland, it is of interest to note, also, a Federal Claims Court case, Maryland Casualty Co. v. U.S.:

By the act of August 5, 1909, a special excise tax was imposed upon the privilege of carrying on business by corporations. It was in reality a license to carry on business ….The Income Tax Act of October 3, 1913, should be considered as a statutory construction of the act of August 5, 1909, in so far as it related to the basis of taxation. (December Term, 1916-17 [52 C. Cls.] Emphasis added. This will take on further meaning toward the end of this paper.)

Be it noted that in the California Penal Code ‘person’ is clearly distinguished from ‘Citizen.’ Penal Code § 228 states: "Any citizen of this state who shall fight a duel…" While at § 232 it states: "Any person of this state who fights a duel…" [Emphasis added.]

"In common usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign…[and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it." Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979), quoting United States v. Cooper Corp. 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941).


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5. ‘Individual.’

The term of art ‘individual’ is also frequently employed in the codes. Which is even more sneaky, because most people believe this word to be, for all intents and purposes, synonymous with ‘a human being’…what the law refers to as a ‘natural person.’ Roman law hardly referred to such a physical being, except the rare usage of singularis persona—which, however, still employs ‘persona,’ thereby preserving a juridical nexus, inapplicable to a sentient man (homo). An abstract, fictitious ‘person’ is needed. Recall Judge Bork, on page 11, above, saying that 90% of those in prison were there because they consented to the process? You consent when you agree to be subject to a statute dealing with persons—which we have seen to be fictional corporate constructs or entities. The code—any of the 48 titles—only applies to a human being at the point s/he agrees to take on the character, status, persona of an artificial juristic persona. Always remember that when the code says "…any person," it means "any person in the jurisdiction of this code." One obligates oneself to the civil code by an act of assumpsit…i.e., volunteering to be that ‘person.’ (Assumpsit: "A promise or engagement by which one person assumes or undertakes to do some act or pay something to another." Black’s Law Dictionary, 6thedition. Recall the Chisholm case, above.) You will never see in any code, State or federal, the word ‘man’ or ‘woman’…or ‘people’—at least I don’t recall having done so—only the juristic, statutory ‘person.’

People are understandably confused about on what I believe to be the correct signification of a particular class of persons, namely, a ‘natural person .’ It is almost always used loosely to refer to the physical, sentient human being. Indeed, in statutory law this is the term of choice for a living man—but always in a qualified sense. At 26 CFR 1.6049-4(f) Definitions we read:

The term natural person means any individual , but shall not include a partnership (whether or not composed entirely of individuals), a trust, or an estate. [Emphasis added.]

Notice carefully how they see it as both possible and necessary to qualify ‘individual.’ If this term stood for a living man, it would be pointless and ridiculous to say that it could not be a trust or an estate! They wouldn’t say that a man shall not include an estate.

So then, we see that ‘person,’ ‘natural person,’ and ‘individual’ are all fictitious legal creations. And, if you acquiesce to being any of them, in a legal setting, you thereby agree that the code addresses and applies to you.

This is why some have an aversion to referring to their appearance in court as being ‘in propria persona’…which some do to avoid pleading pro se, ‘for oneself,’ when appearing without an attorney. They don’t want to represent themselves, but be themselves. And, since ‘in propria persona’means ‘in one’s own proper person,’ it would seem to overcome this objection. Be this as it may—and I am aware of many arguments pro and con—the court still refers to your appearance as being pro se.Personally, if I found myself in that situation, I would appear in rerum natura,‘in the realm of actuality; in existence,’ (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6thedition) the opposite of being a fictitious person.

We should look, too, at the very first term in the general definition chapter for the entire IRC : Section 7701(a)(1)—and well they should begin there, for all statutory law rests on the foundation of this juristic fabrication.

Person . The term ‘person’ shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company, or corporation.

Therefore, since we now know that, in law, ‘person’ can not be anything but a fictitious juridical creation, it follows ineluctably that if ‘individual’ is said to mean the exact same thing, then it must also refer to the same type of unnatural and artificial entity as ‘person.’

This is pretty well nailed down by a couple of cites from the CFR. At 5 CFR 582.101(4) we read:

Persons may include an individual, partnership, corporation, association, joint venture, private organization or other legal entity , and includes the plural of that term; person may include any of the entities that may issue legal process as set forth in… [Emphasis added.]

In 7 CFR 400.303(m) we find:

Person means an individual, partnership, association, corporation, estate, trust, or other legal entity , and whenever applicable, a State or a political subdivision, or agency of a State. [Emphasis added.]

Here it is in the regulations, an individual is a ‘legal entity,’ not a (wo)man, a sentient human being.

So, it makes perfect sense that 5 USC 552(a)(2) should hold that "the term ‘individual’ means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence; (3)…" [Emphasis added.] For a ‘citizen’ is certainly a juristic ‘person.’

A discussion of ‘person,’ however, would not be complete without reference to 26 USC 7343 Definition of term "person."  This is at the very end of Chapter 75 Crimes, Other Offenses and Forfeitures , which includes such goodies as § 7203 Willful failure to file return, supply information, or pay tax ,which begins: "Any person required under this title to pay…" [Emphasis added.]

Section 7343 reads in its entirety:

The term ‘person’ as used in this chapter includes [is restricted to] an officer or employee of a corporation [such as the U.S. or some company incorporated in the federal zone], or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect to which the violation occurs.

For starters, Section 7203 is a penalty section and makes no attempt to establish any liability. Plus, the implementing regulations are in Title 27 BATF…meaning that it is exclusively for their use, with excise taxes! It has nothing to do with the IRS. Leaving all that aside, do you believe that you could be charged as being the person described above? Do you work for the federal government or a domestic (U.S., not State) corporation?


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6. ‘The 50 States,’ ‘the several States,’ and ‘the federal States.’

It is exceedingly noteworthy that in the several thousand pages of the Internal Revenue Code reference is only made to "the 50 States ," on two occasions…at which times it is legally required to do so. The first, 4612(a)(4)(A), reads:

In general. The term 'United States' means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any possession of the United States, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. [Emphasis added.]

Which indicates that the code lawyers know how to be lucid when they wish to…also, note that they use ‘means’ rather than ‘includes.’

The second, 6103(b), is somewhat different:

(5) State. The term ‘State’ means--
(A) any of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands…

They share, however, the clear reference to the 50 States, and they both use ‘means,’ rather than ‘includes,’ or other gobbledygook, such as found in the IRC’s general definition of ‘State’ at § 7701(a)(10), which I analyze in section 7.

I found there are at least three other occasions, however, when they use the phrase ‘several States ,’ in referring to the union states —5272(b), 5362, and 7462.

However, some people mistakenly believe that ‘several States’ always means the 50 States—partly because the Declaration of Independence uses the phrase several times.

Not so! More than one constitutes ‘several,’ and the government usually, though not always, uses the word to lead you to infer their meaning as being the union states. (The phrase ‘several States’ is not a term of art and, therefore, can be used loosely, not being defined in the code.) The fact, however, is that the federal government almost always is making reference to the federal States , when it employs the phrase ‘several states.’ This can be demonstrated by reference to many documents, such as the Congressional Quarterly. But one of the best sources is the Hawaii Omnibus Act, a compilation of all the alterations to the codes and Statutes at Large made necessary by Hawaii’s admission to the union. For example:

Sec. 10. Section 2 of the Act of September 2, 1937 (50 Stat. 917), as amended, is further amended by striking out the words ‘; and the term "State" shall be construed to mean and include the several States and the Territory of Hawaii’. [Emphasis added.]

As established above, ‘State,’ here, cannot possibly make reference to the union states, for it included the Territory of Hawaii. Therefore, ‘several States,’ here, must refer to the federal States.

Like reasoning applies to another section from this Act:

Sec. 3. Section 113 of the Soil Bank Act, as amended, is amended to read as follows: ‘This subtitle B shall apply to the several States and, if the Secretary determines it to be in the national interest, to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands; and as used in this subtitle B, the term ‘State’ includes [only—see analysis of the term ‘includes’ below] Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands .’ [Emphasis added.]

It is obvious that Puerto Rico cannot be a ‘State,’ the same as Oklahoma; therefore, once again, it must be a different species of ‘State’…a federal State .

Title 31, Money and Finance, no longer contains Part 51, Financial Assistance to local governments, and Part 52, Antirecession, Fiscal Assistance to State, Territorial and Local governments. I located a different law library this morning that had some old CFRs, and went there in order to verify the quotes below…in a July 1, 1992 edition. I will include a couple of items that are not directly relevant, but they help flesh out the picture of the two different governments involved. 

Subpart AGeneral Information .

§ 51.2 Definitions . (c) Department means the Department of the Treasury.

§ 52.2 Definitions . (c) Department means the Department of the Treasury.

* * *

§ 51.2(i) Governormeans the Governor of any of the 50 S tate governments or the Mayor of the District of Columbia.

§ 52.2(f) Governor means the Governor or any of the 50 s tates and the chief executive officer of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories of American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.

* * *

§ 51.2(o) Secretarymeans the Secretary of the Treasury .

§ 52.2(n) Secretarymeans the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

* * *

§ 51.2(q) State governmentmeans the government of any of 50 S tate governments or the District of Columbia.

§ 52.2(o) State governmentmeans government of any of the 50 s tates .

* * *

§ 51.2(r) Unit of local government….The District of Columbia, in addition to being treated as the sole unit of local government within its geographic area is considered a [federal] State.

§ 52.2(i) Local government….The term local government includes the District of Columbia. (Text emphasis added.)

By way of brief comment, on a ‘dollar bill’ you will see a green seal inscribed "THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 1789;" no reference is made to the "U.S. Department of the Treasury." But then there are a maze of ‘treasuries’ to be found in the laws of the U.S. Of course, in the Constitution we only find "the Treasury of the United States." This was drastically changed by the Independent Treasury Act of 1921, which I won’t go into. One can get some idea of the present hodge-podge by looking at the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, as seen in P.L. 94-564, p.19:

Section 9 of the bill would also delete the reference in Section 14(c) of the Gold Reserve Act to the ‘Treasurer of the United States " and substitute therefor the "United States Treasury ". This substitution reflects Reorganization Plan No. 26 of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 1001, note) and a reorganization within the Fiscal Service of the Treasury Department, effective February 1, 1974. All accounts of the "Treasurer of the United States", including accounts relating to gold held against outstanding gold certificates, now are accounts of the "United States Treasury". The Department of the Treasury proposes to amend or repeal other statutes, as and when appropriate, to make similar substitutions in the law. [Emphasis added.]

And there are more treasuries not mentioned here.

And the difference between ‘State’ and ‘state’ must certainly have caught your attention…which distinction I use throughout this paper.

And, lastly, on these quotes from Title 13, it is put forth that the District of Columbia is to be "considered a State. " Well, it so happens that the Supreme Court dealt thoroughly with this matter in O’Donoghue v. United States,289 U.S.516 (1933). It stated four conclusions dealing with the relationship between the union states and the District of Columbia and the territories. Three of them spoke of certain regards in which these latter were not states, but one enunciated a sense in which they could be termed ‘states’: "3. That the District of Columbia and the territories are states as that word is used in treaties with foreign powers, with respect to the ownership, disposition, and inheritance of property, 4…" I thank Jerry Brown, Ed. D., for this research, and his observation that this was why the territories were termed ‘states’ in the treaty with Spain. He terms them ‘inchoate states.’ Black’s Law Dictionary, 6thedition, defines ‘inchoate’ as "imperfect; partial; unfinished; begun, but not completed…" (It defines 6 inchoate items, but not a state. So perhaps this is Jerry’s felicitous phrase. I like it.) Incidentally, the U.S. most certainly has tax treaties with the union states—which are admitted to be foreign countries, as I will cite later—just as it does with a couple of dozen other countries.

To this point I have quoted the codes and statutes. Next, I will call attention to a federal court’s rather recent landmark decision, which very few know about. Then finally, we will see what a Congresswoman and the Congressional Research Service have to say—which would seem to cover the matter from about all angles.

The United States District Court for the Virgin Islands decided a very important case, in 1996. It was a petition for redetermination of tax liability, Docket number 96-146, filed July 12, 1996, cited as: Burnett v. Commissioner[of Internal Revenue], KTC 1996-292 (D.V.I. 1996). The court stated that Subtitle A taxes apply only to Washington, D.C. and the territories!! . They cited26 USC 7701(a)(9), the general definition of ‘United States,’ and § 7701(a)(10), the definition of ‘State’—which, as can be seen, they interpreted as I have in this paper!

Extremely important , also, is a letter that Congresswoman Barbara B. Kennelly, from Connecticut, sent on January 24, 1996. I have a fax copy of the original, and will quote it, in pertinent part.

In your letter you asked if Section 3 (a) of H.R. 97 [which she introduced] defining the word state, and 26 U.S. Code 3121(e) are the same. I have checked with Legislative Counsel and the Congressional Research Service about the definition. According to these legal experts, the definitions are not the same. The term state in 26 U.S. Code 3121(e) specifically includes only the named territories and possessions of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa." [Emphasis added.]

The Congresswoman is referring to 26 CFR 31.3121(e)-1 State, United States, and citizen [revised, below, April 1, 1999] where it states that:

(a) When used in the regulations in this subpart, the term ``State'' includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii before their admission as States , and (when used with respect to services performed after 1960) Guam and American Samoa.

(b) When used in the regulations in this subpart, the term ``United States'', when used in a geographical sense, means the several states (including the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii before their admission as States ), the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. When used in the regulations in this subpart with respect to services performed after 1960, the term ``United States'' also includes Guam and American Samoa when the term is used in a geographical sense. The term ‘citizen of the United States ’ includes a citizen of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, and, effective January1, 1961, a citizen of Guam or American Samoa. [Emphasis added.]

How could it possibly be more clear…that here, at least, ‘the several states’ refers to the federal States only ?! A legal maxim expresses the obvious: verbis standum ubi nulla ambiguitas, one must abide by the words when there is no ambiguity.

There is an instructive exception to this usage at 4 USC112(b):

For the purposes of this section [only! ], the term ‘State’ means [not bothering to attempt dissimulation by using ‘includes’] the several States and Alaska, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. [Emphasis added.]

As this section must, by the nature of its subject matter, make reference to the 50 states, as well as the federal zone, it doesn’t hesitate to use words that make its meaning unambiguous. Of course, it is still shying away from the—with one exception, at 26 USC 6103(b)(5)—unique forthrightness of 26 USC 4612(a)(4):

United States. (A) In general. The term ‘United States’ means [not ‘includes’] the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any possession of the United States [Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands], the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. [Emphasis added.]

In Title 4 § 112(b), above, Congress needed to make reference to the 50 states, so it puts ‘and’ after ‘several States,’ instead of a comma, as it would do otherwise. In the government’s usual usage, items following the comma are examples  of what precedes it, not items in addition to it, as you are fostered into believing. For example, "…General Motors cars, Buick, Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, and Cadillac." ‘General Motors’ is not one of the list; it incorporates the ensuing listed items .

This is a stratagem used when defining the federal U.S. by example, as in 26 CFR 1.911-2(g) United States :

The term ‘United States’ when used in a geographical sense includes any territory under the sovereignty of the United States. It includes the States, [comma—meaning, ‘which are comprised of’] the District of Columbia, the possessions and territories of the United States… [Emphasis added.]

There is, then, one thing always to keep in mind when reading the code. With a few exceptions like those mentioned above, it never does, it never needs tonor can it ever refer to the union states and the population at large . It is private contract ‘law’ —i.e., when you sign something mentioned in the code, like a Form W-4, it then, and thereby, takes on the force and effect of law. Without such adhesionment, it has, except for the 17 areas clearly spelled out in 1:8 of the Constitution, as much relevance to a Citizen’s life as the rules at Sears, if one doesn’t work there.

In the lengthy quote of 26 CFR 1.3121(e)-1, on the preceding page, it concluded:

The term ‘citizen of the United States ’ includes a citizen of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, and, effective January1, 1961, a citizen of Guam or American Samoa. [Emphasis added.]

The definition is only for Chapter 21—Federal Insurance Contributions Act , of Subtitle C—Employment Taxes and Collection of Income Tax , whereSection 3121, Definitions , states at (b)Employment:

For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘employment’ means any service, of whatever nature, performed…(B) outside the United States [in Minnesota or New Hampshire] by a citizen or resident OF THE UNITED STATES as an employee for an American employer (as defined in subsection (h))… [Emphasis added.]

    1. American employer. For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘American Employer’ means an employer which is—
    1. the United States or any instrumentality thereof [which includes States and Municipalities, but not Counties —see 26 CFR 301.6331-1(a)(4)],

(2) an individual who is a resident of the [District] United States…

Consequently, it is of crucial import to determine exactly what the meaning of the term ‘United States,’ and a ‘citizen of the United States’ is, for the above chapter 21. For two conditions must obtain before one can be liable for employment tax: 1) one must be a citizen or resident of the United States and 2) one must be an employee of an ‘American employer,’ which is to say, for the most part, a federal, State, or Municipal government.

One readily knows, of course, whether 2), above, applies. If you work for Macy’s, you are home free, in that department. And, from the unassailable investigation of the Legislative Counsel and the Congressional Research Service, as seen in Congresswoman Kennelly’s letter, above, we know that for the purposes of chapter 21, Employment Taxes, exactly what is being termed the 'United States' and a ‘citizen of the United States.’ So, unless you perjure yourself by claiming that you are a U.S. citizen (i.e., for tax purposes), then this condition doesn’t obtain. Both situations, above, must exist or you are not subject to employment tax. If both of these conditions are not present, then 26 USC 3402(p) "Voluntary withholding agreements " (underline added) comes into play, and you are only part of the game IF you and your boss voluntarily agree to do so. Read it!! The ignoring of this crystal clear section by workers, and the flouting of it by the government, is one of the great mysteries and tragedies, on the one hand, and one of the most vile and despicable agendas on the part of the IRS, on the other.

At least one researcher has a problem with an aspect of this, however, for he says that this chapter only gives a geographical definition, and, in his opinion, "‘citizen’ connotes a political sense."

Without going into it too deeply, just let me quote the last paragraph of 26 USC 3121(e) State, United States, and citizen :

An individual who is a citizen of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (but not otherwise a citizen of the United States) shall be considered , for purposes of this section as a citizen of the United States . [Emphasis added.]

Now I don’t see any distinctions here between a political citizen and a geographical citizen. Congress is simply stating, for tax purposes in, a given context, who they considered to be a citizen. the fact is thatTHERE IS NO SINGLE STATUTORY 'UNITED STATES.' There are numerous definitions of that term in the 48 codes, and certainly in Title 26. I give a number in this paper. As an extreme example take § 927(d), which says: "For the purposes of this subpart [of only 6 sections]…(3) United States defined . The term 'United States' includes [only—see section 18] the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." On the other hand, in Section 4612(a)(4), above, you have every conceivable place included—with dozens of shades in between.

The fallback or default definition for the whole IRC is § 7701(9), which speaks of the federal States and the District of Columbia. In other words D.C., the territories, and enclaves, such as military bases. Though I know of one researcher who would exclude the territories, for chapter 21, and proposes that there ‘citizen of the United States’ means citizens of the District of Columbia, the enclaves, and citizens of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Sorry, but this flies in the face of the Kennelly letter. Questioning the Congressional Research Service just isn’t done…at least I have never heard of it. They, and the GAO, are as impartial and unbiased as it is possible to get in the federal government. Neither has an ax to grind. It’s actually really heartening.


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7. ‘State.’

There is another tack, on coming correctly to understand what the codes mean by "State. " In the IRC, chapter 79 definitions applies to the entire title, unless specified otherwise in a given chapter or section. At Section 7701(a)(9) we read:

United States. The term ‘United States’ when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

OK, but what states? The next subsection, § 7701(a)(10), supposedly is intended to answer this:

State . The term ‘State’ shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.

Before analyzing this definition, it is very instructive to trace its development. It all began on June 30, 1864, when Congress enacted its first formulation.

The word ‘State,’ when used in this Title, shall be construed to include the Territories and the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out its provisions. (Title 35, Internal Revenue, Chapter 1, page 601, Revised Statutes of the United States, 43rdCongress, 1stSession, 1873-1874.)

When Alaska was admitted into the union, in 1959, IRC 7701(a)(10) was amended by striking out "Territories" and substituting "Territory of Hawaii."

Then, when Hawaii was admitted, we read in the Hawaii Omnibus Act, 2ndSession, Volume 74, 1960, at Section 18:

(j) Section 7701(a)(10) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to [the] definition of ‘State’) is amended by striking out ‘the Territory of Hawaii and’.

So, after the only two incorporated federal Territories/States left the fold, only the District of Columbia remains as an example…which presents a problem. For, the Supreme Court ruled in Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellsey, 6 U.S. 445, 2 Cranch 445, 2 L.Ed 332, that within the meaning of the Constitution, the District of Columbia is not a "state." Therefore, we know that we are dealing with a different animal here . And, as the 50 states are not mentioned, they cannot be referred to. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius—to include the one is to exclude the other, is an accepted maxim of law (if that’s not a pleonasm).

It is really quite simple. Look at the IRC after Alaska had been admitted as a union state, in January, 1959. It then reads, at § 22(a) of the Omnibus Acts of the 86thCongress 1stSession, Volume 73, 1959:

…and sections 3121(e)(1) [see the Kennelly letter, above], 3306(j), 4221(d)(4), and 4233(b) of such code (each relating to a special definition of ‘State’ ) are amended by striking out ‘Alaska.’ (Parentheses in original. Emphasis added.)

This was done again, when Hawaii joined the union, in August, as we read, above.

Of course, the definition of ‘United States,’ at 26 USC § 7701(a)(9), must also be changed, and is, in the preceding subsection, (i), where "the Territory of Hawaii" is struck out. For it no longer belongs to the U.S. It is now not a federal State , but a free union state. I would truly like to hear how anyone can gloss this over! But keep reading; it gets better.

The above Act supplies a great number of amendments similar to the following:

Sec. 14. (a)(1) Subsection (a) of section 103 of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, relating to [the] definition of State , is amended by striking out ‘Hawaii,’ each time it appears therein. [Emphasis added.]

In other words, when Alaska and Hawaii become the 49thand 50thstates of the union, they immediately had to be dropped from the various definitions of ‘State,’ throughout the 48 titles and the statutes! This means that ipso jure, by the law itself, the Internal Revenue Code does not apply to Alaska and Hawaii!!!—and, therefore, pari ratione, by like reasoning, not the other 48 union states, as well . For, to quote one more legal maxim, res accedent lumina rebus, one thing sheds light on others.

So, then, the above "States other than Alaska and Hawaii " are the federal territorial States —Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands, the Northern Marianas, District of Columbia, etc.—they vary from section to section in the various codes and statutes, as the particular application requires, but they are all, in a loose sense of the word, territories (not incorporated Territories, as were Alaska and Hawaii) in the federal zone.

Due to the apodictic, incontrovertible nature of the above observation, the following placita juris, rules of law, come to mind:

Secundum normam legis, cadit quæstio!
According to the rule of law, there is no room for further argument!

In determining the scope of a statute, one is to look first at its language. If the language is unambiguous,…it is to be regarded as conclusive unless there is a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. Dickinson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, hearing denied, 461 U.S. 911. [Emphasis added.]

Conclusive though the above is, there nevertheless remains much of interest and great importance to say on the subject.

For example, in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (Pub.L. 91-538, Dec. 9, 1970, 94 Stat. 1397 et seq.) it throws out a shocker in Article II(a):

‘State’ shall mean a State of the [District] United States; the United States of America ; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. [Emphasis added.]

Congress, in defining the United States of America as a State, reaffirms what we saw above…it is a geographical entity, as well as a government or political compact distinct from and, therefore, foreign to the constitutionally created United States. And it is listed together with, and therefore distinct from, the federal States, territories or possessions. Verily, this is wondrous strange! It’s almost spooky, as it is so far removed from any rational explanation.

I particularly like the definition in the first version of "The Code of the Laws of the United States of America," of June 30, 1926. [Emphasis added.] In Section 2 it states:

In all courts, tribunals, and public offices of the United States, at home or abroad [in the union states], of the District of Columbia, and of each State, Territory, or insular possession of the United States…

How clear can it get? It says "each State…of [belonging to] the United States."

…the most natural meaning of "of the United States" is "belonging to the United States." Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246 (1907).

Does Iowa belong to the territorial District United States?

Also, I recently heard of a new unearthing by the dauntless South Carolina attorney, Larry Becraft, to the effect that:

The first FULL and complete definition of the word "state " in a federal statute appears in an act to tax booze and tobacco, 15 Stat. 125, ch.186 (July 20, 1868). Section 104 of this act, 15 Stat. at 166, contained definitions for certain words appearing in the act and here you will find the following:

 

...and the word ‘State’ to meanand include a Territory and District of Columbia ... [Emphasis added.]

At that early date, the government did not dissimulate so well. Here, it is simply tells it ‘like it is.’ How could one possibly fit a union state into that definition?!

I also found, in reading 12 USC, chapter 2, § 202 Definitions , that it says:

[T]he term ‘State’ means any State, Territory, or possession of [‘belonging to’…surely, not Florida] the United States, and the Canal Zone." [Emphasis added.]

Note that the Canal Zone is not a federal State, Territory, or possession of the U.S., but is still being classified as a State! But, then, you must always look at the title, chapter, section, subsection, or, sometimes even sentence, to determine the specific intent. Again, there is no ONE statutory ‘United States.’

This is incontestable from the dozens and dozens of definitions of the ‘United States’ in the statutes and codes. And yet one is usually thought weird to contest the underlying theme of the whole IRC—namely, that there is only one United States…the whole nation. This is fatuous, of course, when you really think about it—which almost no one does. Not just because of the Hooven case, above, but because of the numbing number of variations on the definition of the ‘United States’ in the IRC. Some say over 200, which is perhaps too many, but certainly more than one.

In this title (12), ‘Banks and Banking,’ they always seem to use the universally recognized restrictive word ‘means ,’ rather than the IRC’s term of choice, ‘includes,’ that has beguiled, deceived, deluded, hoodwinked, misdirected, and, most of all victimized, basically, the whole country. Such as in § 215b(2) Definitions:

‘State’ means the several Statesand Territories, [comma!] the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. [Emphasis added.]

Here, of course, the confusion is limited to the correct interpretation of the phrase ‘the several States,’ which I have dealt with above.

Title 28, Crimes and Criminal Procedure , also contributes to the correct understanding of ‘State’ and ‘United States.’ Section 5, United States defined says:

The term ‘United States,’ as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all places and waters, continental and insular, subject to the [complete] jurisdiction of the United States , except the Canal Zone. [Emphasis added.]

This, of course, excludes the union states. As does Section 7, Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States defined , where none of the eight jurisdictions mentioned venture beyond the federal zone, into the 50 states. Obviously! If they did, then the designated area would be, eo ipso, in the federal zone and not in the states…a non sequitur.

One last example from Title12: In Section 95a(3) I found:

As used in this subdivision the term ‘United States’ means the United States [oh, really!!] and any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof; [p]rovided, however, [t]hat the foregoing shall not be construed as a limitation upon the power of the Presidentwhich is hereby conferred, to prescribe from time to time, definitions, not inconsistent with the purposes of this subdivision, for any and all of the terms used in this subdivision." [Emphasis added.]

Unquestionably unconstitutional! Even if reference is being made only to domestic—i.e., federal zone—matters, over which the U.S. has jurisdiction…which, of course, must be the case, despite all attempts to imply otherwise. The legislature cannot delegate legislative power to the executive.

This has not been contested yet, as was the President’s authority in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). It was found there that "authorizing the President to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes" of the Act (407) constituted unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to him, and that the regulations for this were "without constitutional authority" (433). Similar cases could be cited.

But then, since the commissions for newly appointed Federal judges are no longer filed with the Secretary of State, but with the Attorney General, under the seal of that executive office, the judiciary is also under the control of the President . Which fact is further confirmed by:

SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S. - RULES

Part VIII. Disposition of Cases

Rule 45. Process; Mandates

1. All process of this Court issues in the name of the President of the United States . (Emphasis added in this sentence.)

So much for separation of powers!!

Please excuse that brief interruption. I will now add the coup de grace, in our investigation of the meaning of the term ‘state,’ in the IRC…and all other codes. It is found in26 USC 7621 Internal revenue districts:

(b) Boundaries.…[T]he President may subdivide any State or the District of Columbia, or unite into one district two or more States ." [Emphasis added.]

This cannot conceivably refer to union states, for it would contravene the Constitution (4:3:1):

New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States , or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. [Emphasis added.]

Another observation throws more light on this matter. The above wording was promulgated 2/1/77. It should have been changed in the Hawaii Omnibus Act, right after Hawaii was admitted to the union, in 1959—as was this section, in the Alaska Omnibus Act, after Alaska was made a state of the union, earlier in the year. I guess that they just held off as long as possible. For, before that, in the IRC revision of 1/3/59, the subsection read:

Boundaries.…[T]he President may subdivide any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or may unite into one District two or more States or a Territory and one or more States. [Emphasis added.]

At that time, the United States had one remaining incorporated T erritory. Ever afterwards, just unincorporated t erritories, such as Guam or the Virgin Islands.

Because of its importance, I will also mention that § 7621 is not listed in the Parallel Table of Authorities, in the Index volume of the CFR for Title 26. This indicates that it does not—can not—have general applicability to the union states and the population at large . Of course not, how could it?!

Without going into detail, I will simply say that the President delegated authority to the Secretary of Treasury to prescribe internal revenue districts (Executive Order No.10289, 9/17/51). The Secretary then re-delegated it to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. This delegated authority is related to the Anti-Smuggling Act and customs duties, so it is not surprising that the accompanying regulations are found in the CFR for Title 19 Customs Duties . United States Customs Service offices are legitimately located in the union states, but the only authorized internal revenue districts were located in Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and other insular possessions. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has delegated authority strictly limited by TDO 150-01 and 150-42, which have nothing to do with any area within the 50 states!

So, it would seem that, legally, there cannot be internal revenue districts in the 50 states, and, yet, we know that there are said to be such so-called districts.

There is a phrase in TDO 150-01, which is interesting…though it doesn’t solve the problem:

6. U.S. Territories and Insular Possessions. .

The Commissioner shall, to the extent of authority otherwise invested in him, provide for the administration of United States internal revenue laws in the United States territories and insular possessions and other authorized areas of the world. [Emphasis added.]

The union states qualify, of course, as "other authorized areas of the world." But that still doesn’t get around the unconstitutionality of applying § 7621 to union states.

But they do it, anyway, in the Federal Register, Vol. 51, No. 53, Wednesday, March 19, 1986, pp. 9571-3, [captioned, interestingly, Number: 150-01! ], entitled Designation of Internal Revenue Districts begins:

Under the authority given to the President to establish and alter Internal Revenue Districts by section 7621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and vested in me as Secretary of Treasury by Executive Order 10574…the following Internal Revenue Districts continue as they existed prior to this order, with the changes noted below…[and there follow dozens of areas so designated.] [Emphasis added.]

All of which are flagrantly unconstitutional. Indeed, this is one of the most blatant and brazen misapplications of the code that I recall. And it is flaunted in our faces, daring us to do something about it.

Going hand in glove with 26 USC 7621is § 7601 Canvass of districts for taxable persons and objects:

(a) General rule. The Secretary shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or employees of the Treasury Department to proceed, from time to time, through each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed. [Emphasis added.]

Unlike § 7621, this section has implementing regulations…as eight parts, however, of Title 27 (BATF). So, there is legitimate canvassing of internal revenue districts. It is just that it is only for such as Subtitle E of the IRC, dealing with tobacco, alcohol, and firearms. And only in the insular possessions of the U.S. 

Allow me to remind you that the Internal Revenue Code is used by both the IRS and the BATF. The IRS has no proprietary hold on it. For example, it has absolutely nothing to do with, and never makes reference to, Subtitle E Alcohol, Tobacco, and other Excise Taxes. And Subtitle F Procedure and Administration , contains all enforcement sections in the IRC, and these, without exception, are implemented exclusively by the BATF, and have to do only with excise taxes. There are a few sections therein that the IRS avails itself of, but they do not involve any aspect of enforcement.

Part 70 of CFR 27 is also where are found the regulations enabling the imposition of income tax on officers and employees of the U.S., because it is an excise taxable privilege to work for the Government. But there are no regulations authorizing canvassing any internal revenue districts for Subtitle A Individual income tax, or Subtitle C employment tax…no matter where these districts are located.

It’s of more than passing interest to note that lacking any statutory or regulatory authority in the 50 states, the IRS, BATF, and other alphabet soup agencies, can be required by law to apply for permission to enter these states, as registered foreign agents , pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 . For they are operating under international law, not under the general, plenary powers of 4:3:2 of the U.S. Constitution, as is the case in the federal zone, but rather under the specifically authorized enumerated special powers of 1:8, therein.

Perhaps it would be easier to understand that IRS personnel are "agents of a foreign principal," if one recalls that our Secretary of the Treasury is also the Governor of the International Monetary Fund and the Bank of Reconstruction and Development, to which he was appointed, per the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, of 1944 (22 USC 286). And, pursuant to Section 3 of this Act, as amended, the U.S. Governor/Councilor is prohibited "from receiving salary or other compensation from the U.S. Government."

Also, one should take note of Title 18 § 219Officers and employees acting as agents of foreign principals and § 591 Agents of foreign governments .

Which should be read in conjunction with 22 USC611(c):

Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the term ‘agent of a foreign principal’ means--
(1) any person who acts as an agent, representative employee, or servant, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal or a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part, by a foreign principal, and who directly or through any other person—

(i) engages within the United States in political activities for or in

the interests of such foreign principal;…

(iii) within the United States solicits, collects, disperses, or dispenses contributions, loans money, or other things of value for or in the interests of such foreign principal … [Emphasis added.]

This should suffice to establish, as stated above, that Internal Revenue personnel are agents operating under the authority, control, and jurisdiction of a ‘foreign principal,’ as laid out in the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund , Article IX, Section 3. And, 22 USC 286h of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act indicates that:

The provisions of article IX, sections 2 to 9, both inclusive…of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank, shall have full force and effect in the [federal District] United States and its Territories and possessions upon acceptance of membership by the United States in, and the establishment of, the Fund and the Bank, respectively. [Emphasis added.]

That Internal Revenue employees are ‘foreign agents is also established by the International Organizations Immunities Act, of 1945, and found at 22 USC 288 and 288f.

In other words, the U.S. has relinquished its sovereignty to these organizations of the UN, and must operate under the above charter—i.e., the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and the Fund. Refer to 22 USC 286e…indeed all of § 286.

(Speaking of relinquishing sovereignty, I must interject, here, that the Congressional Research Service wrote: "As a member of the WTO [World Trade Organization], the United States does commit to act in accordance with the rules of the multilateral body. It [the U.S.] is legally obligated to ensure national laws do not conflict with WTO rules." (8/25/99) To put teeth to this, the Wall Street Journal wrote: "A recent decision by the 'WTO Appellate Body' ruled that $2.2 billion in United States tax breaks violate WTO rules and must be eliminated by October 1, 2000." What constitutes 'United States' changes almost daily, it seems.)

That this has substance is demonstrated by the fact that sheriffs can, and have, limited the entry of IRS agents into their county. Agents have even been thrown in jail, and let out only on condition that they don’t return! In some counties there are virtually no liens and levies filed, or prosecutions for failure to file tax returns. For, all these three actions are ultra vires…performed without delegated authority granted sub curia, under law.

The following is from a communication I received recently, concerning what the famous Bighorn Sheriff did, a couple of years ago:

Sheriff Dave Mattis stated that all federal officials are forbidden to enter his county without his prior approval. If a sheriff doesn't want the Feds in his county he has the constitutional power and right to keep them out or ask them to leave or retain them in custody . The court decision came about after Mattis and other members of the Wyoming Sheriffs' Association brought a suit against both the BATF and the IRS in the Wyoming federal court district seeking restoration of the protections enshrined in the United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution. The District Court ruled in favor of the sheriffs, stating that ‘Wyoming is a sovereign state and the duly elected sheriff of a county is the highest law enforcement official within a county and has law enforcement powers exceeding that of any other state or federal official.’ The sheriffs are also demanding that federal agencies immediately cease the seizure of private property and the impoundment of private bank accounts without regard to due process in state courts . [Emphasis added.]

Another wrinkle in this garment can be seen by the fact that I specifically recall hearing, some years ago, that some congressperson or senator (I forget who) registered as a foreign agent in the State that elected him. For, the annotated Title 18 lists a half a dozen cases ruling that a member of Congress is an officer of the 'United States'—and I think that you are becoming informed enough to realize which 'United States'….and that it is a foreign government under private international law. (See section 21, below, which is so titled.)

This brings to mind some clear, indisputable, but oft-forgot words of the Supreme Court:

The Government of the United States is one of enumerated powers;…it has no inherent powers of sovereigntyKansas v. Colorado, 206 US 46 (1906) [Emphasis added.]


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8.  The Hawaii Omnibus Act.

Because of its importance, I want to focus a bit more on the Hawaii Omnibus Act (Vol. 74, Public Law 86-624). It is described as "An Act To amend certain laws of the United States in light of the admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union…" It constitutes 13 pages of intriguing amendments to various federal statutes and codes, that the government was forced to promulgate—which is really a stand-alone exposé of the contortions that the federal government goes through to mask its identity, and, thereby, to mislead Americans into believing that they are subject to laws which they are not. But, if we weren’t so hopelessly indoctrinated, this Act, by itself, would shatter the delusion that all Americans are U.S. citizens and, therefore, subject to all the federal codes and laws.

I recommend reading the whole Act, for I can only call attention to a few points, among this ‘embarrassment of riches,’ as the French say.

I will begin with a quote concerning the IRC, at § 18(a):

Section 4262(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to the definition of ‘continental United States’ for purposes of the tax on transportation of persons) is amended to read as follows: ‘(1) Continental United States.—The term "continental United States" means the District of Columbia and the States other than Alaska and Hawaii.’ (Underline added. Parenthesis in original.)

The use of "other than" implies that Alaska and Hawaii were previously ‘States" similar to whatever political bodies were referred to by the preceding word, "States." To further verify this is the case, it is necessary to go back to the also important Alaska Omnibus Act, of the 86thCongress, Volume 73, 1959, which accommodated the statutes and codes to Alaska’s having been made a ‘state.’ We read at § 48:

Whenever the phrase ‘continental United States’ is used in any law of the United States enacted after the date of enactment of this Act, it shall mean the 49 States on the North American Continent [which would include, now, Alaska] and the District of Columbia [as in section 25(b) of the Hawaii Omnibus Act], unless otherwise expressly provided . [Emphasis added.]

There is the catch…‘unless otherwise expressly provided!’ One need only look at Section 22 to see where it is so provided…for it is obviously not so in § 18(a), above:

(a)…and sections 3121(e)(1) [remember this section from the Kennelly letter?], 3306(j), 4221(d)(4), and 4233(b) of such code (each relating to a special definition of ‘State’ ) are amended by striking out ‘Alaska. (Parentheses in original. Emphasis added.)

(b) Section 4262(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (definition of ‘continental United States’) is amended to read as follows: ‘(1) The continental United States.—The term ‘continental United States’ means the District of Columbia and the States other than Alaska.’ [Emphasis added.]

Here, in this section, Hawaii, despite being comprised of islands in the middle of the Pacific, is considered, by implication, to be part of the ‘continental’ U.S. For otherwise it would not have been thought necessary to exclude it from the same section, 4262(c)(1), a few months later, after Hawaii was taken into the union. In ‘words of law’ islands can be termed continental; there is no necessary relationship to the world as normally defined. Thus, with Hawaii and Alaska, we view how a S tate ceases to be a S tate when it becomes a s tate!

So, in answer to our question, above, the "States other than," in this section of the Hawaii Omnibus Act, can refer only to the federal States …of Guam, the Northern Marianas, etc.

One should also note Section 27 of the Hawaii Omnibus Act:

(b) striking out the words ‘continental United States, its Territories, and possessions’ in section 211(j) and inserting in lieu thereof the words ‘States of the Union , the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States.’ [Emphasis added.]

Here, the use of ‘its’ indicates that the federal territorial U.S. is being referred to, for the 50 union states obviously don’t possess any Territories; its agency, the U.S., does. In fact, there are no more incorporated Territories, now that Hawaii has become a union state—hence, the need to expunge the word from any definition of the United States. 

This interpretation is substantiated by the numerous times that ‘continental’ is struck out of the phrase ‘continental United States,’ in this Act—indicating that all along, in these instances, ‘continental United States’ was no different than the federal corporate territorial District ‘United States’ …it just had a slightly different makeup… incorporating the Territory (federal State) of Hawaii.

There is another facet of these amendments which cries out for mention, such as seen in the following:

…striking out ‘continental United States’ in clause (ii) of such sentence and inserting in lieu thereof ‘United States (which for the purposes of this sentence and the next sentence means the fifty States and the District of Columbia )’. (Section 14(d)(2)) [Emphasis added.]

…The term ‘United States’ means (but only for purposes of this subsection and subsection (a) ) the fifty States and the District of Columbia. (Section 29(d)(3)) [Emphasis added.]

In other words, only on rare occasions in the codes and statutes is it found necessary to refer to the 50 States . Only in a sentence here, or in a subsection there…each such occasion being scrupulously noted, and disclaimed as being the norm , just as above. Which fact alone, one would think, would suggest to even a school child that elsewherethis was not the case . It is almost like they are waving a red flag and exclaiming: ‘Please be advised that only in this specific and particular instance are we compelled and allowed to make reference to the 50 union states united by and under the Constitution. ’

Yet, look what here replaced ‘the continental United States’ in § 27(b), above: "States of the Union , the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States." Just as it was in the preceding subsection, § 27(a)…as well as in § 8(a), § 36, and § 38.

This presents a problem, for everyone believes that this phrase stands for the 50 union states. And, yet here, in this section, at least, it is being equated, with the territorial ‘United States.’ I will let the reader ponder the solution of this conundrum, for I have no answer. I would recall to your mind a similar appropriation of the term "United States of America" that I discuss in section 2.

In any event, ‘States of the Union’ unmistakably refers to the 50 union states in Section 45 of the Hawaii Omnibus Act:

purchases of typewriters

Title I of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1960, is, [sic] amended by striking out the words ‘for the purchase within the continental limits of the United States of any typewriting machines’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘for the purchase within the States of the Union and the District of Columbia of any typewriting machines’.

This is because, previously typewriters had been bought from Alaska and Hawaii…which, as Territories, were, therefore, "within the continental limits of the United States." Now, as two of the fifty ‘States of the Union,’ they were not within the continental limits of the federal United States.

So, a show of hands. Who still believes that the ‘States’ referred to in the codes—unless pointedly qualified—embraces the 50 union states?


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9. A few general remarks.

Along with the instances I have noted, there is another place in which the deviousness and sneakiness of the IRS really shows. In three sections of the IRC they need to encompass all union states. In 4132(7) they say that ‘U.S.’ has the meaning that it does in 4612(a)(4), where the 50 States are mentioned. Then, in 4672(b)(2), they remove it yet another stage, saying that it has the meaning that it does in 4662(a)(2), wherein it says that it has the meaning that it does in 4612(a)(4)! They just do not like to use the words "50 States!" All of which calls more attention to the fact that the code only rarely has occasion to refer the 50 union states.

And, they actually cannot do so , except where required, as above. For, as some like to put it, they are to a great extent, though not exclusively, writing the employment conditions for those who work for the federal government , as well as for those two categories mentioned at the beginning of the IRC and its regulations. E.g., 26 CFR 1.1-1:

Income tax on individuals (a) General rule. (1) Section 1 of the Code imposes an income tax on the income of every individual who is a citizen or resident of the [federal District] United States . [Emphasis added.]

The first sentence in the IRC reads somewhat differently. Part 1 is titled simply:

Tax on individualsSection 1 Tax imposed. (a) Married individuals filing joint returns and surviving spouses. There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of— [Emphasis added.]

Be aware that all headings in the code are without any legal force or effect, as pointed out by the IRC, itself, in 26 USC 7806(b). The heading or title, here, is guilefully misdirecting, for there never has been and never could be an "income tax" on individuals …except an apportioned tax or a capitation tax. It would be unconstitutional—and the federal District government generally makes a great effort to write (albeit deviously) its laws in conformity with the Constitution. This wording is, doubtlessly, to give the impression that it is a direct tax. Indeed, the very first sentence of 26 CFR, after the heading, states what most ‘taxpayers’ (incorrectly ) believe that the tax is on. It’s "an income tax on the income …"—or, as 26 USC words it, "on the taxable income …" So, in both cases, in less than a dozen words, there is a switch from a tax on "individuals " to one on "income " or "taxable income."

This leads to the embarrassing question as to what exactly is "income." This is a moot point, of course…unless one is a ‘taxpayer.’ But, I will pursue the matter in order to provide a full understanding as to why the IRS feels compelled to indicate in everyone’s ‘Individual Master File’ that all ‘individual income taxpayers’ are corporations, and pay corporate income tax.

Congress does not try to define internal revenue ‘income ’ in the code, or elsewhere— and the Supreme Court says that they (Congress) can not do so! Section 61 of the IRC, weasels out by simply defining "gross income ." But that’s like defining a green apple as an apple that is the color green…without defining apple.

It might be of passing interest that Section 61, one of the most crucial sections of Subtitle A, has not had any legitimate application for a number of years. Briefly, a footnote to Section 61 of the 1954 revision of the IRC reads: "Source; Sec.22(a), 1939 Code, substantially unchanged." The Parallel Table of Authorities in the Index of the CFR indicates that 26 USC 22, of the 1939 IRC, corresponds to 26 CFR Part 519. A following table shows that Part 519 is the Canadian Tax Treaty, a 75 year treaty signed in 1918, which expired in 1993, and is now not operative, but shown as ‘reserved’ for future use. So, Section 61 does not, and never did, define taxable income from American sources , but rather from Canadian sources. One of the many gems hidden right out in plain view. The deception is not that the documentation isn’t available; it’s that the IRS proceeds on its course knowingly ignoring it.


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10. Corporate entities.

I will seek to demonstrate, now, why "income tax" must come from corporate entities .

I believe that I can best begin by quoting from what is easily one of the half dozen most important U.S. Supreme Court tax cases: Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920):

[I]t becomes essential to distinguish what is and what is not "income"…and….Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter.

After examining dictionaries in common use…we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Act of l909 (Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S.399, 415Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185)—"Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined," provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the DoyleCase (pp. 183, 185)

"Derived—from—capital"…Here we have the essential matter: nota gain accruingto capital, not a growthor incrementof value inthe investment but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding fromthe propertysevered from the capital however invested or employed, and coming in, being "derived," that is, received, or drawn bythe recipient (the taxpayer) for his separateuse , benefit, and disposal—thatis income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description.

The same fundamental conception is clearly set forth in the Sixteenth Amendment—"incomes, fromwhatever source derived…" Eisner at pp. 206-208. (Italics are in the original text; bold added.)