Fraudulent Juristic Name
(Here is your Straw Man)
July 18, 2003
By Dan Meador
Original (Dec. 4, 1999)
The following memorandum was constructed to use in a pleading. It explains the reason juristic names, i.e., JOHN DOE, are substituted in court headings and other documents generated by government agencies and financial institutions for proper names, i.e., John Doe.
In all pilot cases, and in all litigation observed by the People of Kay County initiating this petition, cases have been originally styled, or attorneys, the court clerk, and judicial officers have converted originals to, juristic, trade, or commercial names rather than using proper names of the parties. For example, the living moral being John Doe will be identified as the juristic JOHN DOE. In the representative cases attending this petition, Dan Meador has consistently been misidentified as DAN MEADOR or some variation thereof, Norma Gail Meador has consistently been misidentified as NORMA GAIL MEADOR or some variation thereof, and Aaron Don Riggs has consistently been misidentified as AARON DON RIGGS or some variation thereof.
The requirement of proper names, and the mandate for correction when p roper names are provided, is set out clearly and simply relating to criminal prosecution at 22 Okla. Stat. § 403:
· When a defendant is indicted or prosecuted by a fictitious or erroneous name, and in any stage of the proceedings his true name is discovered, it must be inserted in the subsequent proceedings, referring to the fact of his being charged by the name mentioned in the indictment or information.
In general, it is necessary to properly identify parties to actions or judgments are void, as treated in Volume 46, American Jurisprudence 2d, "Judgments":
· § 100 Parties [46 Am Jur 2d JUDGMENTS]
A judgment should identify the parties for and against whom it is rendered, with such certainty that it may be readily enforced, and a judgment which does not do so may be regarded as void for uncertainty. Such identification may be achieved by naming the persons for and against whom the judgment is rendered. Technical deficiencies in the naming of the persons for and against whom judgment is rendered can be corrected if the parties are not prejudiced. A reference in a judgment to a party plainly liable , followed by an omission of that party's name from the language of the decree, at least gives rise to an ambiguity and calling for an inquiry into the court's real intention as reflected in the entire record and surrounding circumstances. [Footnote numbers omitted; cites not reproduced]
The matter of proper names, spelled with capital first letters only, has repeatedly been addressed to each defendant named in this petit ion. However, the court clerk, judicial officers, and attorneys have consistently ignored the matter, or when it has been pressed in hearings, have skirted the issue by alleging that use of all capital letters in case headings is simply a matter of style. However, this excuse is indicted by consistent refusal to correct names in case headings in spite of proper name spelling, i.e., John Doe instead of JOHN DOE, being provided to those responsible. If style was the only issue, those responsible would correct form when given notice, or would cite law authorizing use of all capital letters for names. The practice clearly contradicts mandates of 22 Okla 2E Stat. § 403 and standard rules of English usage and grammar.
The United States Government Printing Office Style Manual, March 1984 edition, provides comprehensive standard grammar and usage for government publications, including casework. Chapter 3, "Capitalization", at § 3.2, prescribes rules for proper names: "Proper names are capitalized." Examples given are, "Rome, Brussels, John Macadam, Macadam family, Italy, Anglo-Saxon."
Chapter 17, "Courtwork", preserves rules of capitalization prescribed in Chapter 3:
· 17.1. Courtwork differs in style from other work only as set forth in this section; otherwise the style prescribed in the preceding sections will be followed.
At § 17.9, the Style Manual specifies, "In the titles of cases the first letter of all principal words are capitalized, but not such terms as defendant and appellee." Examples in § 17.12 are consistent with the § 17.9 specification, all proper names being spelled with capital first letters only, the balance of each spelled with lower case letters.
By reviewing definitions and comments in The Oxford English Dictionary (1971 ed.), which is possibly the most authoritative dictionary of the English language in the world, proper capitalization and usage is made clear. In this dictionary, under the term "Christian", the term "Christian name" is defined as follows: "6. Christian name: the name given at christening; the personal name, as distinguished from the family name or surname." All examples given are consistent with standard rules of capitalization, the first letter only capitalized. Likewise, the term "Surname" follows this same pattern; all are spelled with capital first letters only, the surname generally being the family or last name. Together, the Christian and surnames are the proper name or names of people. Under the term "Proper" The Oxford English Dictionary prescribes capitalization rules:
· b. Gram. Applied to a name or noun which is used to designate a particular individual object (e.g. a person, a tame animal, a star, planet, country, town, river, house, ship, etc.). Opposed to Common a. 17 a.
A proper name is written with an initial capital letter. The same proper name may be borne by many persons in different families or generations or by several places in different counties or localities; but it does not connote any qualities common to and distinctive of the persons or things which it denotes. A proper name may however receive a connotation from the qualities of an individual so named, and be used as a common noun, as a Hercules…
Elements of Style by Strunk and White, an authoritative, concise book on English grammar, and the Associated Press Style Manual, recognized as the grammar and style bible for publishing writers, concur with and endorse capitalization of first letters only for proper names. Yet without authority of law or any other viable excuse, the court clerk, judicial officers, and attorneys who practice in the Eighth Judicial District consistently, habitually, and willfully displace proper names with juristic or trade names in case headings, i.e., JOHN DOE instead of John Doe.
Because the practice is consistent and seemingly universal, it cannot be without purpose. Which is to say, there is some reason for name perversion. The reason is explained by definitions found at 15 U.S.C. § 11 27, reproduced below in relative part:
· From the U.S. Code Online via GPO Access [Laws in effect as of January 27, 1998]
Sec. 1127. Construction and definitions; intent of chapter
In the construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is plainly apparent from the context & emdash;
The United States includes and embraces all territory which is under its jurisdiction and control.
The word "commerce" means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.
The term “person" and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic person as well as a natural person. The term "juristic person" includes a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable of suing and being sued in a court of law.
The term “person" also includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any non governmental entity.
The terms “applicant" and “registrant" embrace the legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns of such applicant or registrant.
The terms “trade name” and “commercial name" mean any name used by a person to identify his or her business or vocation.
The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof & emdash;
1. used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
The term “service mark" means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof & emdash;
1. used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of others and to indicate the source of t he services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names, and other distinctive features of radio or television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor.
The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce & emdash;
1. on goods when & emdash;
2. it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
3. the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the ser vices are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.
This section is referred to in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1526 & 1595a , which primarily involve maritime drug trade. This is one of three primary purposes of the juristic or commercial name, i.e., JOHN DOE instead of John Doe. The juristic or commercial name, trade name, is predicated on maritime causes, i.e., private international law.
The second implication is that the "public servant" is involved in a "trade or business", as defined in the Internal Revenue Code at § 770 1(a) (26): "The term ‘trade or business’ includes the performance of the functions of a public office."
The link between "trade or business" in the Internal Revenue Code to commerce at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 is, "The term ‘person’ also includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity."
The third and probably most important link is "public money", all of which is hypothecated on credit of the United States. Only departments and agencies of United States Government and instrumentalities of the United States, including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands, and officers and employees of these governments, are entitled to receive and use "public money". This is the key link with the banking system: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures only deposits of "public money". Specification of who is entitled to receive and use public money is clearly spelled out in regulations relating to Treasury tax and loan depositaries a t 31 CFR § 202.1:
· The regulations in this part govern the designation of Depositaries and Financial Agents of the Government (hereinafter referred to as depositaries), and their authorization to accept deposits of public money and to perform other services … Public money includes, without being limited to, revenue and funds of the United States, and any funds the deposit of which is subject to the control or regulation of the United States or any of its officers, agents, or employees… [Underscore added for emphasis]
People throughout the constitutionalist movement are concerned about the Federal Reserve Note, which amounts to private-issue scrip. In reality, the Federal Reserve Note is a minor issue compared to public money. Virtually all transaction accounts such as checking and passbook savings accounts are colorable hypothecated on credit of the United States even though financial institutions chartered and/or regulated by federal government, FDIC, and/or the Federal Reserve System employ deceptive, fraudulent, and unlawful means to issue private bills of credit. Credit of the United States is public money.
Current credit and monetary systems where "credit" is used to defer payment rather than actually pay debt are patently unconstitutional. Article I § 8 of the Constitution of the United States empowers Congress t o mint coin and regulate its value, and to prescribe punishment for counterfeiting securities and current coin of the United States, then Article I § 10 prohibits the several States from emitting bills of credit, minting coin, or making anything but gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt. Yet Congress has ceased fulfilling the constitutional mandate to provide gold and silver coin as the nation’s lawful currency, and officers of the several States brazenly ignore Article I § 10 prohibitions.
The so-called income tax, which is simply the "normal tax" of 1862 which issued against officers and employees of United States Government, was resurrected in 1918 (42 Stat. 233; see definition of "employee" at the current 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c)), then extended to insular possessions of the United States via the so-called Buck Act (4 U.S.C. §§ 105- 111; see definition of "State" as applicable only to the District of Columbia and insular possessions). Oklahoma’s link to the so-called income tax is at 51 Okla. Stat. § 46:
· Title 51. Officers.
§ 46. Procedure Required.
In every instance where the United States of America or the State of Oklahoma, or both, have enacted laws requiring reservation or withholding of tax levied upon salaries, wages, or other compensation of officers, deputies, and employees of the state or of any county, city, town, board of education, or school district or any other municipal subdivision thereof, the public funds of which, under the system of checks and balances prescribed by the Legislature under mandate of the Constitution of this state, are disbursed only upon warrant upon the treasurer pursuant to verified itemized claim, the procedures herein prescribed are authorized, and required to be followed, for the purpose of enabling the tax s o withheld to be transmitted, without delay and without peril of penalty, to the Collector of Internal Revenue in the case of the United States an d to the Oklahoma Tax Commission in the case of the state. [Underscore added for emphasis]
The "United States of America", treated separately, is a confederation or compact of insular possessions of the United States, the entity exclusive of and foreign to States of the Union. The section above confirms links to the foreign "United States of America" and "public funds", i.e., "public money", which is the object of the normal tax and the exclusive medium federally chartered and/or regulated financial institutions a re authorized by law to traffic in. Since the Constitution of the United States mandates that Congress mint gold and silver coin for a national currency, and prohibits the several States from emitting bills of credit or making anything but gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt, the Federalism/Cooperative Federalism scheme rests on the notion that all people throughout the nation are government officers and employees engage d in "trade or business" entitled to use of "public money" as deferred compensation.
Limits of application to the District of Columbia and insular possessions are clarified by the definition of "State" at 31 CFR § 215.2(m), which governs withholding by financial institutions authorized as Treasury tax and loan depositaries: "State means a State of the United States or the District of Columbia, unless otherwise specified."
In and of itself, the juristic, trade or commercial name, i.e., JOHN DOE instead of John Doe, might be insignificant except that it provides a colorable means for holding real people accountable for the artificial entity that theoretically exists at the pleasure of the State. In original capacity, federally chartered, licensed, or regulated financial institutions are associations which can solicit and provide basic financial services such as checking accounts only for qualified association members, those being officers and employees of United States Government and instrumentalities of the United States. They traffic exclusively in public money. Both State and Federal income tax systems are privilege excise taxes where the "wage" is not the object, but the measure of the tax. The government officer or employee is construed to be engaged in "trade or business", and he functions in commerce under a juristic, trade or commercial name. All "credit" colorably extended via federally chartered and/or regulated financial institutions is hypothecated on credit of the United States, wit h said "credit" not paying, but deferring payment of debt (15 U.S.C. § 7; 1602).
Use of the fictional or juristic name, JOHN DOE, is fraud of the first order. It is simply one more device employed as a transparent, insulating barrier over lawful government to defeat and thereby render constitutions of the United States and the dejure State of Oklahoma ineffective.
To Dan M:
Somewhere in the middle of the Straw Man memo is a reference to
"... the juristic or commercial name, i.e. JOHN DOE, instead of John Doe."
This comes immediately after extensive quotes from 15 USC 1127.
I may have missed something, but I don't find anything in the entire memo to support the contention that the style JOHN DOE is "the juristic or commercial name".
The juristic name memo has to be read in the context of the others. It isn't intended to be an exhaustive treatment. There are actually four memorandums that work in concert to support the conclusion; I sent three out yesterday. I have two more to write that will further address the "Federalism" scheme for general purposes.
One of the interesting related items is FBI authority, which you will find at 28 U.S.C. § 535. The Attorney General and the FBI have authority to investigate Title 18 crimes committed by government employees. Read notes following 28 U.S.C. § 531: The FBI wasn't created by Congress; it is an "administrative" agency. Therefore, it is an "intergovernmental" agency that cannot exceed authority of the officer or department that created it.
If Joe Public wasn't presumed to be a government officer or employee, would FBI have authority to investigate and prosecute him? No, no department, bureau or agency of government can do anything other than what Congress specifically authorizes via statute. Consequently, we are left with one of two conclusions: Either FBI is blatantly exceeding statutory authority, or the exercise of authority is predicated on some hidden presumption. Since we know what authority the FBI has, per 28 U.S.C. § 535, we must conclude that FBI's presumption of authority lies within the framework of statutory authority.
You need to go to a good book store and pick up one of the LSAT study manuals -- the LSAT is the law school SAT. Spent two or three weeks working study questions, which for the most part deal with various "logical" reasoning constructs, then read the Straw Man and the other memorandums again.
The way the memorandum is to be used will not require absolute proofs. Where we have "evidence" of the requirement for use of proper names, consistent use of juristic names without authority of law demonstrates a pattern of behavior that has (1) purpose, and (2) intent. Where the conclusion we offer is supported sufficiently to establish probability, and is reinforced by related evidence addressed in other material, the memorandum is sufficient to establish presumed fact. By establishing the probability and presumed fact, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. He must disprove the presumed fact with an alternative explanation that can be established as legal authority.
Look at Rule 301, Federal Rules of Evidence, and corresponding state rules of evidence. The pattern of behavior will be established via documentary and testimonial evidence.
Possibly I need to do some editing on all the memorandums I sent out, so editorial commentary in particular is welcome. Others will go over them before they are assembled for use.
Thank you for the response.
PRODUCED & DISTRIBUTED BY: Dan & Gail Meador, 1108 N. 2nd Street Ponca City, Oklahoma 74601; Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Memorandums by Dan Meador and other researchers can be downloaded from Internet on the Law Research & Registry web site: www.LawResearch-Registry.org
Beware of those who slander and mislabel the messenger to hide the message from you.
Experience the MESSAGE.
Truth is the same now and forever.
TRANSMITTING UTILITY defined
Proof That There Is a "Straw Man"
Freedom of speech - use it or lose it
When they took away the 4th Amendment,
we were quiet,
because we didn't deal drugs.
When they took away the 6th Amendment,
we were quiet,
because we were innocent.
When they took away the 2nd Amendment,
we were quiet,
because we don't own guns.
Now they appear taking away the 1st Amendment,
and very soon,
if we continue to be quiet,
we will have no choice,
but to be continue to be quiet.
IF CENSORSHIP OCCURS THE CredIBILITY OF THE MESSAGE IS AFFIRMED.
WOULD GOVERNMENT TRY TO STIFLE A MESSAGE THAT IS NOT EXPOSING THE TRUTH?
Oppression of expression is confession