George Mercier's Invisible Contracts

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I N V I S I B L E   C O N T R A C T S

George Mercier





Through entry into the juristic highways of Interstate Commerce by

participation in an insurance policy program, as insurance is

Interstate Commerce, and the King retains a third party beneficiary

status in all Commercial transactions that full under his regulatory

Commercial Jurisdiction penumbra.  In 1944, the Supreme Court decided




[632] 322 U.S.  533 (1944).  [632]end


which held that insurance, all by itself, is Interstate Commerce; so

if you manage to participate in policies of insurance, you are

participating in Interstate Commerce; Federal commercial benefits are

being accepted, and the reciprocal QUID PRO QUO taxation is necessary.

The fact that the insurance company may be state chartered and

licensed to do business in only one state, and that the policy may

have been negotiated, accepted, written, and entered into in only one

state are not relevant indicia as effecting limitations on federal

Jurisdictions; PERSONS paying premiums on policies of Insurance are

PERSONS playing in King's Commerce.  A year later after UNITED STATES


Congress enacted the MCCARREN ACT, [633]


[633] 59 Statutes 33; Title 15, Section 1011 to 1015.  [633]end


declaring that the:


      "...  continued regulation and taxation by the several states of

the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence

on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier

to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several states."


Yes, even the Congress of the United States knows that the application

of PRINCIPLES OF NATURE relating to silence that are incorporated into

the RATIFICATION DOCTRINE is even held to be binding on them in some

circumstances.  This Congressional pronouncement, that silence in the

context of a proposition being made constitutes acceptance, applies to

all appropriate factual settings, and is held to apply to all PERSONS,

even the Congress itself.  But as for taxation expectations, your

acceptance of the benefits of an insurance program is deemed as

evidence of entry into Interstate Commerce, and hence such

participants are an object suitable for Federal taxation, regardless

of any political Status, and regardless of the presence or absence of

any other juristic contract.



                I N V I S I B L E   C O N T R A C T S

                            George Mercier


                      FEDERAL LICENSING PROGRAMS



By experiencing the direct benefits of Commercial enrichment acquired

through a Federal license program, such as being an SEC registered

stockbroker, or an ATF licensed manufacturer of fireworks, which is an

obvious pursuit of federally participated profit or gain.  Several

federal monopolies were designed specifically for the existing

participants to experience intensive Commercial enrichment in, as the

net effect of a regulatory jurisdiction is to discourage potential new

market entrants from competing with established corporate titans.  In

any market there are only so many potential customers available, and

excluding new upstarts allows existing Grandfathers to have a bigger

slice of the pie they would not otherwise be experiencing.  For

example, the creation of National Banks by the Congress, through the

Comptroller of the Currency, is one such monopoly designed to enrich

existing market participants, while shutting out new banks and

damaging the end consumer.  In any one demographic banking district,

there is only so much business to be had; cutting out new entrants

keeps a bigger slice of the banking pie for the owners.  [634]


[634] For example, in 1967, F.W.  Pitts wanted to bring a new National

Bank into the Hartsville, South Carolina area.  He submitted an

application to the Comptroller of the Currency for a license

certificate, and the request was denied.  Reason:

      "...  we were unable to reach a favorable conclusion as to the

need factor." - CAMP VS.  PITTS, 411 U.S.  138, at 139 (1973).  That

is correct: The Comptroller denied the application because the

community was already adequately served by other banks, and there was

no "need," seemingly, for the new proposed national bank.  In this

way, the existing banks in Hartsville shut out a new impending

competitor.  The letter from the Comptroller, in turning down the

License request, listed the banks already in the Hartsville area and

the deposits they carried [CAMP, id., at 139].  The Comptroller seemed

to be very concerned about enhancing the financial enrichment of the

existing banks; and at no time was there any discussion about the

improved service the end consumer would be experiencing, or of the

very competitive rates of interest on loans that new upstarts

searching for business charge.  But like the tightly regulated

issuance of local Television Station licenses by the FCC, the

Comptroller of the Currency is on a mission: To make sure that the

owners of existing banks are very well fed, and so throwing Torts at

the public is nothing they are going to concern themselves with.  For

a summary of the laws creating obstacles for new prospective banks to

go into business, see the Editor's Notes called BANK CHARTERS,


71 Yale Law Journal 592 (1962).  [634]end


The secondary consequences of restraining the number of new market

entrants politically are elevated prices the end consumer winds up

paying, constricted services and retarded technological innovations.



[635] The telephone companies have exclusive geographical districts

assigned to them with no competitors -- a pure monopoly; and if the

FCC had not intervened to allow third party telephones and other

equipment to be connected to local telephone company lines, you would

never have been able to have automatic redialing on your phones --

such nice little effort savers are the result of competition, and not

your local phone company, who could care less.  Computers have been

used extensively for telephone switching since the middle 1960's, and

the continuing refusal of the phone company to assign a few byte

locations in their computer's memory to remember your last dialed

number, occurred for just one reason: They have a monopoly, they have

their enrichment pipeline set up, and they don't care about you at all

[a relative statement that will be viewed as being excessively harsh

by those who never bothered to give any thought to evaluating,

comparatively, the service attitude manifested by businessmen in a

competitive operating atmosphere, with those businessmen who don't

need to concern themselves with competitive pressures.] Yes,

MINIMALISM rules in all uncompetitive environments, Commercial and

otherwise.  [635]end




                I N V I S I B L E   C O N T R A C T S

                            George Mercier





      7.  By experiencing state created juristic benefits (such as

through the vehicle of corporations by being

shareholders/directors/officers).  In 1910, the Supreme Court ruled

that if a Prince creates some type of a profit or gain situation in

Commerce (and remember that King's Commerce is a closed private domain

belonging to Government), then the King can participate in taxing that

profit or gain that the Prince created.  [636]


[636] This Principle was applied to an Income Tax collection setting

in FLINT VS.  STONE TRACY COMPANY, 220 U.S.  108 (1910).  [636]end


When state created benefits are accepted by you, then the Commercial

enrichment you experience within that state franchise is very much

within the taxing power of the United States Government; and that is

correct Law.  [637]


[637] "While the tax in this case, as we have construed the statute,

is imposed upon the exercise of the privilege of doing business under

a corporate capacity, as such business is done under authority of

state franchises, it becomes necessary to consider in this connection

the right of the Federal Government to tax the activities of private

corporations which arise from the exercise of franchises granted by

the state in creating and conferring powers upon such corporations.

We think it is the result of the cases heretofore decided in this

court, that such business activities, though exercised because of

state created franchises, are not beyond the taxing power of the

United States.  Taxes upon rights exercised under grants of state

franchise were sustained by this court in RAILROAD COMPANY VS.


U.S.  327 (1882).  [See also 106 U.S., page 703 for opinions by


MCCLAIN, 192 U.S.  397 (1 903)." - FLINT VS.  STONE TRACY COMPANY, 220

U.S.  108, at 155 (1910).  [637]end


Additionally, the King can tax other state created Commercial benefits

that are experienced by others like attorneys and accountants who, as

Special Interest Groups, use the police powers of the state for their

own private enrichment, by setting up shared monopolies and then

experiencing higher revenues than otherwise obtainable under a

LAISSEZ-FAIRE free market entry without restrictions on new lower

priced competitors entering into their trade.  [638]


[638] The objective of monopolies is to make money, they are

enrichment oriented legal devices benefiting their members; the story

told by members of the monopoly, deflecting the existential reasoning

off to the side with sweet sounding lies that portray their monopoly's

bleeding heart objectives as merely being just pure concerns of public

welfare and QUALITY, are fraudulent.  For a protracted and thorough

discussion on the negative quality side effects of professional trade

licensing, on how they fail their stated purposes [meaning that their

purposes were fraudulently stated at the time of monopoly creation]

and are counter-productive in a wide-ranging array of areas, and for a

history of licensing, see David B. Hogan in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF


Behavior 117 (1983).  Numerous other articles in the September, 1983

issue of LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR explain why quality necessarily

degenerates in that inherently uncompetitive atmosphere that

characterizes shared monopolies.  In the old English Case of DAVENPORT

AND HURDIS [11 Coke 86], the court there refers to the increase in

prices and deterioration in quality and commodities, which necessarily

results from the granting monopolies [see THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES,

83 U.S.  36, at 103 (1872).]

      "In practice, such [regulatory] restrictions frequently are

designed to give some profession or occupation monopoly power.  It is,

for example, very difficult to argue that most professional licensure

laws are primarily concerned with quality control [see Stigler in THE

THEORY OF ECONOMIC REGULATION, 2 Bell Journal of Economic and

Management Science 3, at 13 (1971)].  Simple restrictions on the

number of market participants are also generally explicit grants of

monopoly power to a limited group.  While limits on the number of

taxicabs in a city may reduce traffic congestion, they also benefit

license holders [see Kitch in THE REGULATION OF TAXICABS IN CHICAGO,

14 Journal of Law and Economics 285 (1971)." - Susan Ross Adams in


Review 931 (1985).  [638]


This game of using penal statutes to create shared enrichment

monopolies is quite old, and yet look around you today and see how

many bleeding heart folks there are, who really want to believe that

line that Government is their friend, just somehow; and also fall for

the fraudulent line that such a monopoly is for their own protective

good -- by keeping all those evil quacks, vile frauds, and assorted

degenerate incompetents out of the legal and medical professions.



[639] Never mind the fact that before the Professions were

monopolized, folks had to check references and exercise business

judgment, as in any other business arrangement where you are dealing

with unacquainted people.  Today, the mere fact that licenses are in

force automatically precludes much inquisitive background questioning

that should still be asked -- Government has assumed the role of

qualifier for you; and many persons holding licenses, when asked of

their qualifications, refuse to give references and merely point

attention over to that license -- dealing with such a person,

shrouding his business background behind a veil of secrecy, is

improvident.  A prime example lies in the regulatory jurisdiction

asserted over securities and related Commercial investment instruments

-- the mere fact that Government has conducted a searching probe

called FULL DISCLOSURE (a fraudulent characterization since much

material is forbidden to be included in a PROSPECTUS), automatically

reduces normal intensity questioning by prospective investors; and so

as a result, investors are pre-emptively deprived of the ability to

collect facts, exercise a risk/yield assessment judgment, and then

make a risk investment -- Government is really your friend when

stripping you of the important learning ability to acquire judgment

experientially [try to ask a corporate officer for additional

information not contained in that PROSPECTUS their lawyers wrote -- he

won't give you any, since it is illegal; some big friend Government

is].  Persons placing overriding priority on the perceived important

function of protecting the public financially from investment con

artists or investments without merit, to justify depriving other

people of the exercise of their own comparative investiture placement

judgment and the benefit of acquiring real intrinsic knowledge

experientially, are manufacturing unnecessary Torts they will later

regret, as the purpose of this Second Estate is exclusively

intellectual.  And any operation of Government which impairs or

attempts to impede the acquisition of factual knowledge or the

unrestricted flow of information between Individuals, is literally a

Doctrine of Devils.  And as for MD's, if licensed medical doctors know

what they are doing as well, then why is it that whenever they go on

strike, the death rate drops?  [I am reminded of the circumstances

that King Louis the 15th went through, when he was a small infant.  He

had contracted chicken pox, and an attending nurse hid him from the

French medical profession to spare his life; doctors had previously

killed Louis's brother and father during treatment].  [639]end


Although we might not be too philosophically sympathetic with the

manipulative use of Legislatures to create monopolies and the

Tortfeasance that is thrown at us in the adverse secondary

circumstances flowing from their operations, as a matter of law,

creating game rules for voluntary players in King's Commerce is

largely immune from Constitutional restrainments.  [640]


[640] "...  and although we have no direct constitutional provision

against a monopoly, yet the whole theory of a free Government is

opposed to such grants, and it does not require even the aid which may

be derived from the Bill of Rights [of Connecticut], the first section

of which declares that 'no man or set of men, are entitled to

exclusive public emoluments, or privileges from the community' to

render them void.  The statute of 21 James I., C. 3, which declares

such monopolies to be contrary to law and void, except as to patents

for a limited time, and printing, the regulation of which was at that

time considered as belonging to the king's prerogative, and except

also, certain warlike materials and manufactures, the regulation of

which for obvious reasons may fairly be said to belong to the king,

has always been considered as merely declaratory of the common law." -

NORWICH GAS VS.  NORWICH CITY GAS, 25 Connecticut Reporter 19, at 38

(1856) [CONNECTICUT REPORT carries the Cases from the Connecticut

Supreme Court.]

See also the briefs for Counsel in THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES [83 U.S.

36 (1872)] as they contain a great deal of legal material in

opposition to monopolies [6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE


Kurland and Casper [University Publications, Arlington, Virginia

(1975)].  The Supreme Court in THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES discusses the

great CASE OF MONOPOLIES, decided during the reign of Queen Elizabeth

which held that all monopolies, in any known trade or manufacture, are

an invasion of the liberty of the Citizens to acquire property, and

pursue happiness, and were declared void at Common Law, which is

correct reasoning when applied to appropriate Tort Law factual

settings lying outside of any participation in that closed private

domain of King's Commerce.  [THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES addressed the

question as to whether or not monopolies were forbidden by the 13th

Amendment and several clauses in the 14th Amendment, by reason of the

damages they c reate on Citizens].  [640]end


In France in the 1600s, Finance Minister Jean Colbert once wrote a

CODE OF COMMERCE [sometimes called the CODE SAVARY (1673)].  The Code

created controlled entrance guilds, and laid down rules for

apprenticeship and admissions of masters.  An extensive number of

trades were so regulated by the Code, and once entrance into those

guilds was restricted [i.e., the number of possible competitors was

restricted], then the demand for taxes immediately appeared:


      "Each new guild was to pay certain sums for the granting to it of

statutes and regulations..."

      "Colbert raised money from the organization and reorganization of

the guilds...  and made of them before the century was out congealing

monopolies which the state [wanted], because revenue could be raised

from them." [641]


[641] COLBERT'S LIFE AND THEORIES, Volume I, page 309 and Volume II,

page 457 [Columbia University Press (1939)].  [641]end


As a general rule, money raising statutes that generate enrichment for

the Crown never die; and down to the present day, a portion of the

Commercial law of France remains based on the 122 Articles of

Colbert's CODE OF COMMERCE.  [642]


[642] Levasseur, HISTORIE DE COMMERCE, I, 299-300.  [642]end


But here in the contemporary United States, once a state has got you

tied into a licensing program of some type, then and there you are

experiencing some type of state created juristic benefit, and as such,

you then become a federal taxable object for this benefit accepting

reason alone.  When presented with such a state license, no other

questions about the existence of the National Citizenship Contract, or

any other juristic contract, ever need be asked by those termites in

the IRS searching the Countryside for some meat to lay into.  [643]


[643] Here in New York State, for example, Section 441(1)(d) of the

Real Property Law defines individuals who are eligible to apply for,

and receive, state licenses for the sale and brokerage of real estate.

Licenses are granted freely to either Citizens of the United States,

or to aliens; once a license to experience financial enrichment in a

shared business monopoly has been issued, the state does not care

about your political relational status to the King, or any associated

benefits accepted thereby.  With such a license in effect, for taxing

purposes, your Prince has you tied down but good and tight.  [643]end


Other state monopolies like Driver's Licenses and motor vehicle

registrations are very much used by the IRS in many ways to assist

them in tax collections; and state tax collectors also use these

records for their own statute enforcement and state treasury

enrichment conquests as well.  When those Driver's License records are

collected by the state, they are also forwarded to Washington, and

then redistributed to foreign persons and foreign political

jurisdictions under numerous executive agreements, diplomatic and

military treaties, and bureaucratic cordialities.


Yet, even though you entered into those state licenses merely to avoid

your incarceration as an unlicensed driver, the uncontested

preparation of a state created juristic personality, such through a

Driver's License, to the Supreme Court would be prospectively

sufficient for that Court to attach IN PERSONAM liability to Title 26

as a Person accepting special state created benefits.  [644]


[644] "Whatever a state may forbid or regulate it may permit upon

condition that a fee be paid in return for the privilege.  And such a

fee may be exacted to discourage the prosecution of a business or to

adjust competitive or economic inequalities.  Taxation may be made the

implement of the exercise of the state's police powers." - ATLANTIC &

PACIFIC TEA COMPANY VS.  GROSJEAN, 301 U.S.  412, at 426 (1936).



It is also reasonable to infer that a Driver's License is evidence of

Residency, and of the acceptance of a wide-ranging array of state

benefits tailored to Residents.  Remember that your use of those

highways is your acceptance of a benefit that Government created, and

since reciprocity is expected back in return, contracts are in effect:

Invisible and automatic.  [645]


[645] And the pronouncements of Highway Contract Protesters, arguing

that Highway Contracts do not exist until the Driver's License

application itself has been signed, is defective reasoning, as I will

explain later.  [645]end


If you do so file objections to the assertion of a Beneficent Taxable

Juristic Commercial Status over you by way of a Driver's License, you

will need to again prove your present STATE OF MIND; and the exact

state code criminalizing such innocuous behavior has to be quoted

within the body of your Objection.  Some folks prefer to play it safe

and avoid the Driver's License altogether; while others selectively

use deception in assuming a NOM DE PLUME for purposes of deflecting

recourse identification.  [646]


[646] Judges often have a difficult time ruling on the question as to

whether or not an assumed name was fraudulently used to deceive other

people.  The reason why this difficulty is inherent with assumed names

is due to the Common Law right of anyone to assume any name they feel

like, how and when they feel like it, and without any petition to

Government for such an assumption of a NOM DE PLUME.  See UNITED

STATES VS.  COX, 593 F.2nd 46 (1979), and UNITED STATES VS.  WASMAN,

484 F.Supp.  54 (1979), for Cases where Federal Judges wrestled quite

a bit with this question.  [646]end


However, other folks are not able to so quickly terminate the Driver's

License due to the fundamental importance of the thing and either

their present inability to successfully handle a criminal prosecution

or their reluctance to assign something deleterious to it; and so at a


originated in Federal District Court is in order.  The Declaratory

Judgment, ruling that the Driver's License was a COMPELLED LICENSE,

existing as a coerced instrument signed by you to avoid incarceration

as an unlicensed driver, and is not to be used by the IRS or anyone

else for the expansive purposes of evidence of either Residency or of

Domiciliary, nor as evidence of entrance into Commerce, or of the

taxable acceptance of federal or state created benefits, or of consent

to be bound by any statute, other than those state motor vehicle

statutes.  The objective of our pursuit of a Declaratory Judgment is:

That since the license was compelled out of us when some DE MINIM IS

tension is in effect with a Substantive Right (the RIGHT TO TRAVEL),

and since the avowed purpose of the license itself is to adduce

EVIDENCE OF COMPETENCY, then the extraneous collateral expectations of

reciprocity in any area outside of those Motor Vehicle Statutes it

would otherwise create when left unchallenged, is now terminated.



[647] The DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL is slightly different from


who wrongfully induced another to adversely change his position from

asserting a right or defense, which is what happens when IRS termites

start chopping away at the off-point benefits derived from a State

License acquired solely to avoid penal consequences, under tension

with a Substantive Right:

      "...  the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is

absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights

which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of

contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good

faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his

position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some

corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy." -

J. Pomeroy in 3 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Section 804 95th Edition


Traditionally, Courts have been reluctant to hold the operation of

this Doctrine against the Government.  [See generally ESTOPPEL AGAINST

STATE, COUNTY, AND CITY in 23 Washington Law Review 51 (1948)].

Consequently, since Government is let off the responsibility hook,

people with claims against the Government have often suffered wrongs

unnecessarily that Courts would not have tolerated had both litigants

been non-juristic parties; yet things have been loosening up a bit



University of Colorado Law Review 433 (1975)].  In 1981, the Supreme

Court seemed willing to entertain the use of this EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

DOCTRINE against the Government in SCHWEIKER VS.  HANSEN [see


Cornell Law Review 609 (1982)].  [647]


If you are going to Object to, and have new narrow contours now

defined on your Driver's License in order to restrain its use by other

Government agencies as the high-powered King's Equity attachment

instrument that it is, then the Objection should generally follow the

model pattern set forth above in the discussion of Federal Reserve

Notes.  This Objection should refer to the exact state penal statute

that you are applying for the license under Objection and protest,

merely to avoid incarceration as an unlicensed driver.  [648]


[648] Contracts entered into where arrest was threatened are coercive,

and are wide open to attack.  Read the story of the finding of the

sunken lost Spanish Galleon ship, the ATOCHA, and the subsequent

muscle threats by the State of Florida to arrest the underwater

treasure hunters if they didn't agree to turn over a percentage of

their treasure finds to the Florida Prince, in the STATE OF FLORIDA

VS.  TREASURE SALVORS, INC.  [458 U.S.  670 (1980)].  Footnote number

4 refers to the Federal District Court in Florida that ruled that

those contracts so signed were coercive.  [If the treasure hunters

were smart, they would have filed a REJECTION OF POLICE POWER BENEFITS

with the State of Florida, and then present the Judiciary with an

entirely different factual setting to rule on.  Maybe the Treasure

Hunters wanted the protectorate benefits of the guns and cages offered

by the State; if so, then they should have tendered the reciprocity so

expected.] [648]end


Remember that the Supreme Court is in Washington, and you are out in

California, Florida, or Texas, and it is unreasonable for you to

assume that the Supreme Court knows the state statute that you are

Objecting to, so quote it for them verbatim.  How can you engage in

involuntary behavior based on threats contained in a state statute, if

you don't even know what the statute says?  [649]


[649] When addressing an evidentiary question -- such as the

appropriateness of assigning BURDENS OF PROOF to either Government or

the Individual, under circumstances where the Individual does not want

to do something but penal statutes intervene to change his reluctance

-- Justice Frankfurter once said that:

      "Where an individual engages in conduct by command of a penal

statute...  to whose laws he is subject, the gravest doubt is case on

the applicability of the normal assumption -- even in a prosecution

for murder (see LELAND VS.  OREGON, 343 U.S.  790) -- that what a

person does, he does of his own free will.  When a consequence as

drastic as [enfranchisement] may be the effect of such conduct, it is

not inappropriate that the Government should be charged with proving

that the Citizen's conduct was a response, not to the command of the

statute, but to his own direction.  The ready provability of the

critical fact -- existence of an applicable [penal] law, particularly

a criminal law, commanding the act in question -- provides protection

against shifting the burden to the Government on the basis of a

frivolous assertion of the defense of duress.  Accordingly, the

Government should, under the circumstances of this case, have the

burden of proving by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that

the Citizen volun tarily performed an act causing [enfranchisement]."

- Justice Frankfurter in NISHIKAWA VS.  DULLES, 356 U.S.  129, at 141


The actual factual circumstances in NISHIKAWA involved similar Tort

questions of the unfairness of involuntary expatriation when a

Citizenship Contract is hanging in the background.  [649]end


If you are just too busy to go down to the law library and find out

the exact wording of that penal statute, I have no sympathy for any

rebuffment that you will experience later on as some appellate forum

rules adversely against you, on the grounds that your STATE OF MIND

was not clarified substantively or timely.  Also included should be a

brief recap of the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases in the United States Supreme

Court.  [650]



Such as:

      - EDWARDS VS. CALIFORNIA, 314 U.S. 160

      - TWINING VS NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78

      - WILLIAMS VS. FEARS, 179 U.S. 270, AT 274

      - CRANDALL VS. NEVADA, 6 WALL. 35, AT 43-44


      - U.S. VS. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, AT 757-758 (1966)

      - GRIFFIN VS. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88, AT 105-106 (1971)

      - CALIFANO VS. TORRES, 435 U.S. 1, AT 4, note 6

      - SHAPIRO VS. THOMPSON, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)

      - CALIFANO VS. AZNAVORIAN, 439 U.S. 170, AT 176 (1978)

All of which were cited in ALEXANDER HAIG VS.  CIA AGENT PHILIP AGEE,

435 U.S.  280, at 306 (1980), which reaffirmed the RIGHT TO TRAVEL

within the United States, and then distinguished that Right from the

lessor administrative "freedom" to travel outside the TERRA FIRMA of

the United States as being discretionary, within reasonable limits, by

the King over his Subjects, as all "Citizens" are operating under the

administrative jurisdiction of contractual King's Equity.  See also a


VS.  LAUB, 385 U.S.  475 (1966); and THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL: THE PASSPORT

PROBLEM by Louis Jaffee in 35 Foreign Affairs, at 17 (October, 1956)

which discusses, at a light level, the national interest implications

involved when the RIGHT TO TRAVEL is under tension with statutes.



Patriots and Highway Protesters are reaching incorrect conclusions

when they cite the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases as being sufficiently

substantive to annul state statutes requiring highway operator's

licenses.  Those RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases only offer a line of reasoning

parallel with your objectives.  Only in loose DICTA does the reasoning

found in the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases support your position; so they

offer a mitigating source of relief against state statutes, but not a

necessarily vitiating source of relief.  Nowhere did our Founding

Fathers restrain the states from requiring licenses to operate motor

vehicles or anything else on public highways, and the words RIGHT TO

TRAVEL do not even appear anywhere in the Constitution.  [651]


[651] Remember the word PUBLIC, as used by Judges, generally means

GOVERNMENT.  When appellate judges use the words AFFECTS A PUBLIC

INTEREST to justify some further state intervention somewhere, what

they mean is that a Government interest is affected.  As applied to

Highway law, partial justification for the state judicial affirmance

of the requirement to hold an operator's license is the fact that the

regulatory jurisdiction the State Legislature is asserting over those

highways does, in fact, "affect a Governmental interest," as it is the

state that spends the money to acquire the land, build the highway,

and then spends incredible amounts of more money, year in and year out

without any let up, to maintain those roads.  If that does not affect

a Governmental interest, then would someone explain just what would?



And although the words RIGHT TO TRAVEL do not appear anywhere in the

Constitution, the Supreme Court has, through their Opinions, given

that right Constitutional status cognizance.  [652]


[652] "...[The] right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution.

The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was

conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the

stronger Union the Constitution created.  In any even, freedom to

travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a

basic right under the Constitution.  ...  The constitutional right to

travel from one State to another...  occupies a position fundamental

to the concept of our Federal Union.  It is a right that has been

firmly established and repeatedly recognized." - UNITED STATES VS.

GUEST, 383 U.S.  745, at 757 et seq.  (1966) [Sentences were quoted

out of order].

Although that statement is correct, it only applies to INTERSTATE

traveling.  Protesting Patriots suggesting that fraudulent factual

averments of INTERSTATE traveling be adduced as defensive instruments

in local traffic prosecution arguments, as I have heard, are

improvident -- the selective incorporation of deception into your

MODUS OPERANDI will only postpone the day of arrival for that SILVER

BULLET which Highway Contract Protesters are searching for, a bullet

which lies within yourselves.  [652]end


But whatever DE MINIMIS protective penumbra the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases

offers, you are now invoking to abate both your regional Prince and

the King's Tax Collectors who use Department of Motor Vehicle

information and legal assumptions that information infers for their

own enrichment purposes.  In this circumstantial context of submitting

a carefully pre-planned and prepared written Objection, where time is

not of the essence, failure to cite your authorities (failure to

explain your justifications) timely could be fatal.  You are up

against high-powered adversaries, and lightly drafting papers, as if

you were on a picnic, is fatal.  Judges do not owe you Justice aligned

with your philosophy; those are adversary court proceedings you are

in, where mere preponderance wins, and an insubstantive Objection is

open to attack.  (And remember that a RIGHT TO TRAVEL also lies

outside of, and beyond the reach of, the King's Charter (the

Constitution).  [653]


[653] Does the following restrainment on Government appear any place

in the Constitution?...

      "The streets belong to the public in the ordinary way.  Their use

for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, and generally at

least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems

proper." - PACKARD VS. BARTON, 264 U.S. 140, at 144 (1923).  [653]end


Some judicial forms from another era have applied the LIBERTY CLAUSE

in the Fifth Amendment to restrain the interference by the FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT in the RIGHT TO TRAVEL area (but keep in mind that those

Cases were ruled upon in an era when automobiles and other

high-powered technology did not exist in the United States, and

highway contracts WITH STATES did not exist then, as well).  [654]


[654] "The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which the

Citizen cannot be deprived of, without due process of law under the

Fifth Amendment...  Freedom of movement across frontiers...  and

inside frontiers as well, was part of our heritage..." - KENT VS.

DULLES, 357 U.S.  116, at 125 (1958).  [654]end


So your objective in having the contours of the Driver's License

restrained to now apply only to Highway Contract grievances, the RIGHT

TO TRAVEL being claimed is both of a Constitutional origin, as well as

of a Natural origin, ex-Constitutional.  [655]


[655] The Supreme Court once ruled that the RIGHT TO TRAVEL interstate

overruled State arguments of social or economic consequences:

      "The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a

right of constitutional significance, and the Court's decision,

therefore, did not require an AD HOC determination as to the social or

economic importance of that right." - SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT VS.

RODRIGUEZ, 411 U.S.  1, at 32 (1973).  [655]end


But important for the moment is the Objection itself, and your

Declaration therein that you are not a Resident or a Citizen of that

State together with correlative supporting averments of Benefit

Rejections, [656]


[656] Remember that Residency contracts are presumed to be in effect,

and contracts have to be attacked for substantive reasons, such as

FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, and do not roll over and die by your mere

unilateral declarations of their nonexistence.  [656]end


regardless of any statute that facially appears to force Residency

Status on persons physically inhabited in that state for an extended

period of time.  [657]


[657] In certain pleading contexts, there is not a lot of legal

difference between a DOMICILIARY and a RESIDENT.  In HAMMERSTEIN VS.

LYNEE [200 Federal 165 (1912)], a Federal District Court ruled that

the word RESIDE in the 14th Amendment's State Citizenship Clause also

meant DOMICILIARY.  One of the characteristics of the English Language

is the lack of identity of some of the words that comprise its

structure; many words have found multiple homes in different

locations, and therefore meanings must be abated pending consideration

of an enlarged context of the surrounding words.  RESIDENCE and

DOMICILE are two such words in Law that, on some occasions, are

interchangeable, and on other occasions, are not interchangeable.  The

recurring semantic nature of some words [that Judges are partly

responsible for since they continuously refuse to define explicit

meanings] to be inherently difficult broncos to tie down, was noted

once by a Federal Court, when dealing with a DOMICILIARY question:

      "The theoretical domicile which is equivalent to State Citizenship

is always one which exists ANIMO REVERTENDI [meaning WITH INTENTION TO

REVERT BACK].  The theoretical domicile which clings to a homeless

wanderer, who never intends to return, has its uses in deciding rights

of succession to property, in respect to taxation and to the

administration of pauper laws, but is not, I think, equivalent to

Citizenship in the sense in which the word "citizen" is used in the

Judiciary Act.  While domicile, in some sense, may not be lost by mere

departure with intent not to return, State Citizenship is thus lost.

In other words, where the word "domicile" is used as meaning home,

where absence from domicile is AMINO REVERTENDI, domicile may be

equivalent to State Citizenship; but where domicile exists merely by

legal fiction, and absence is accompanied by intent never to return to

the state of domicile, the word is not synonymous with Citizenship." -

PANNIL VS.  ROANOKE TIMES COMPANY, 252 Federal 910, at 915 (1918).

Therefore, correctly pleading Supreme Court rulings on the purely

voluntary nature of Citizenship is suggested, and that you are an

Inhabitant of that State WITHOUT JURISTIC BENEFITS, and neither a

Resident nor a Domiciliary BENEFIT ACCEPTANT; but your self-proclaimed

status as an INHABITANT means nothing until you first reject all state

constitutional benefits, and the benefits of Residency, and the police

protectorate powers, in particular.  [657]end


But if your Objection does conform to this model, then a Judge

generally will be reluctant to hold the spurious unrelated reciprocity

terms of a Commercial contract (which Driver's Licenses can be applied

to operate as a Commercial Enfranchisement Instrument under some

limited circumstances) against a person, in a setting other than the

originally specified terms, who has proved that they entered into that

contract under compelled circumstances in order to avoid incarceration

merely to enjoy a Substantive natural Right (the RIGHT TO TRAVEL), and

without experiencing any Commercial benefit therefrom.  [658]


[658] State Residency statutes were once overruled by the Supreme

Court on grounds relating to RIGHT TO TRAVEL.  In SHAPIRO VS.

THOMPSON [394 U.S.  618 (1969)], the Supreme Court ruled that the

INTERSTATE right to travel overruled and annulled state residency

statutes [where welfare grants offered by States restricted to persons

living in that kingdom for at least one year, where annulled.  This is

a unique case in the sense that its reasoning will never surface

anywhere else, as the claimed "chilling effect" the state residency

statutes generated on the Interstate Right to Travel represented one

of philosophical justification.  Substitute the same "chilling effect"

RIGHT TO TRAVEL reasoning on any other Patriot state residency

Protester case, and the Federal Judge will snort at you.  [658]end


That is the type of an Objection the Supreme Court wants to hear.  The

documentation and proof that the Supreme Court would want to see is a

copy of the application for the Driver's License where it says you

signed it under protest; proof of service of your Objection on state

officials, the Objection itself, and a 30-day invitation to those

state officials to let them cancel or rescind the Driver's License if

the application of Commercial Status and/or Residency Status is deemed

mandatory on all License holders (thus requiring those state officials

to come out of the closet and expose some Status oriented law to you

they might not want you to know).  Under your DECLARATORY JUDGMENT,

the Driver's License will be construed to act exclusively as EVIDENCE

OF COMPETENCY under Motor Vehicle statutes only.  [659]


[659] "Automobile licenses are issued periodically to evidence that

the drivers holding them are sufficiently familiar with the rules of

the road and are physically qualified to operate a motor vehicle." -

DELAWARE VS.  PROUSE, 440 U.S.  648, at 658 (1978).  [659]end


If they do decide to rescind, this is a classic Case for

Administrative Law intervention; and in either alternative

administration disposition, you win.  Here, our administrative

grievance with the state concerns the disputed Commercial and

Enfranchised Residency Citizenship Status that your Driver's License

will otherwise be judicially construed to convey in the future.

Uncontested Driver's Licenses can very much be used by state taxing

commissions as evidence of Residency, and hence evidence of an IN

PERSONAM attachment of liability for the expected reciprocal payment

of benefits accepted on the state Income Tax, among many other

juristic things.  As viewed by sophisticated appellate judges, for

state vehicle code enforcement purposes, Driver's Licenses are

EVIDENCES OF AN OPERATOR'S COMPETENCY, and are not, in this context,

the Evidences of Consent to be Regulated in Commerce that Highway

Contract Protesters occasionally talk about.  The state does not need

any "Driver's License" from you, in order to for ce you into an

administrative contract when you accept the benefits of driving a

motor vehicle down a state highway.  Patriots propagating the view

that the mere existence and non-existence of a Driver's License

attaches and detaches liability to those state highway regulatory

statutes are misleading their followers: You don't need any written

contract on someone in order to sue someone and bring him into a Court

and perfect a judgment against the poor fellow -- but you do need to

show the acceptance of benefits and of the expectation of reciprocity,

which elements are very much present when a motor vehicle is operated

on state provided highways, with "Public Notice" statutes creating the

expectation of reciprocity.


Under this setting, it might be preferable to move directly for a

Judicial Declaration of Status, rather than pursuing Administrative

ESTOPPEL remedies.  That DECLARATORY JUDGMENT is important protection

material for you in other non-related areas of taxation, and you have

a good chance of getting one issued out, and so submission of your

Case to a sequence of state Administrative Law procedures, in hopes of

using Collateral Estoppel abatement arguments later on, might be

discouraged in this instance.  Federal Judges will be reluctant to

listen to California Motor Vehicles Department Administrative Law

questions in an IRS Case of some type, even though the Judge knows

very well that there is some peripheral merit to what you are saying.

And so all factors considered, jumping to a DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

becomes appropriate by necessity in this unusual factual setting of

redefining the contours of an Adhesion Contract Driver's License to a

limited and narrowed construction (meaning: Evidence of Highway

Competen cy, only).


One of the evolving stages in the life of what are now contemporary

penal Motor Vehicle Statutes had, as one of their previous stages, the

purpose of assigning legal rights and liabilities to Motor Vehicle

operators so that civil litigants can have fault and damages assessed

against them in a courtroom.


For example, in Massachusetts, it originally was known as the



[660] In 1692 the Colonial Legislature of Massachusetts enacted a

little slice of LEX, called the LORD'S DAY ACT, that said:

      "... no traveler shall travel on that day..."

In 1876, a negligent Defendant successfully invoked this statute to

bar the recovery by a Plaintiff who was injured while walking on a

Sunday [SMITH VS.  BOSTON AND MAINE R.R., 120 Mass.  490 (1876)].  To

the Supreme Judicial Court, the Plaintiff was "...  unlawfully

traveling upon the highway" [id., at 492].  In 1877, the Massachusetts

Legislature removed the civil liabilities that permeated the LORD'S

DAY ACT.  [660]end


and later evolved into a regulatory jurisdiction when Massachusetts

enacted a comprehensive Motor Vehicle Act after automobiles made their

highway appearance.  [661]


[661] "...  all automobiles...  shall be registered" and "...  no

automobile...  shall be operated...  unless registered." -

MASSACHUSETTS ACTS, c.473, Section I,3 (1903).

Six years later, in DUDLEY VS.  NORTHHAMPTON STREET RAILWAY [202 Mass.

443 (1909)], the court denied an owner of an unregistered car recovery

against a negligent Defendant on the ground that the former was a

"trespasser on the highway." Although the Defendant pressed the

analogy of the LORD'S DAY CASES, the court was able to find additional

support for its ruling, by attributing to the statute a purpose of

facilitating identification of motor travelers by requiring

registration of vehicles.  By also forbidding the operation an

unregistered automobile, the court found it logical to charge the

motor vehicle owner and operator of an unregistered motor vehicle with

liability for damages caused to others, regardless of any mitigating

negligence elements present in the factual setting.  In FAIRBANKS VS.

KEMP, 226 Mass.  75 (1917), the owner of an unregistered automobile,

although exercising due care and caution, was held liable because of a

statutory violation].  See, generally, - Huddy in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

AUTOMOBILE LAW, Section 249 (1932); Fifth Edition;

- Editor's Note in TRESPASSER ON THE HIGHWAY DOCTRINE, 46 Harvard Law

Review (1946).  [661]


The talk from Patriots and Highway Contract Protesters that I hear

constantly, about how the old Common Law says this and that about my

rights to use Government Highways anyway that I feel like it, [662]



"Highways are public roads, which every Citizen has a right to use."

      -     3 Kent Commentaries 32.

See also; several English authorities:

      -     SUTCLIFFE VS. GREENWOOD, 8 Price 535;

      -     REX VS. CAMBERWORTH, 3 B. & Adol. 108.

And for other English commentators, see:


      -     WOOLRYCH ON WAYS.

For American authorities, a point of beginning is:

      -     MAKEPEACE VS. WORTHEN, 1 N.H. 16;

      -     PECK VS. SMITH, 1 Connecticut 103;

      -     ROBINS VS. BORMAN, 1 Pick. 122;

      -     JACKSON VS. HATHAWAY, 15 Johns. 477;

      -     STACKPOLE VS.  HEALY, 16 Massachusetts 33, and the many Case

citations therein.  [662]end


is actually not relevant today in the United States.  [663]


[663] For a detailed presentation of what our Father's simple Highway

Common Law was like in that serene and tranquil era, before automotive

technology contamination steamrolled our Common Law into the ground by

way of an overriding contract, see: TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS,

by Joseph Angell [Little, Brown & Company (1868)], and its Second

Edition, published in 1886; and LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS, by Byron

Elliott [Brown Merrill & Company (1890)] and its Second Edition

published in 1900.  Both books have thousands and thousands of Case

citations.  The Fourth Edition has two volumes and was co-authored by

Byron and William Elliott [Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis

(1926)].  [663]end


      Reasons: First, the factual setting that our Father's Common Law

on free ingress and egress developed out on the King's Highways is not

replicated today in the United States, since technology has changed

the factual setting that our Father's Common Law used to operate on.



[664] What technology has done to our Law on a factual setting of

Government highways is the same that technology has done to the Law of

Patent Property Rights:

      "I have little doubt, in so far as I am entitled to express an

opinion, that the vast transforming forces of technology have reduced

obsolete much of our patent law." - Felix Frankfurter in MARCONI

WIRELESS VS.  UNITED STATES, 320 U.S.  1, at 63 (1942).

And just as technology rolled up its sleeves and went to work to

convert our once quiescent highways over into a setting of

high-powered vehicles, so too has technology gone to work on running

our Patent Law into the ground; and now also privacy itself has also

fallen by the wayside, as technological innovations make their

appearance on the scene:

      "Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next

step which must be taken for the protections of the person, and for

securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be

let alone.' Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprises have

invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and

numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that

'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the

housetops [footnotes deleted]." - Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, 4 Harvard Law Review 193, at 195 (1890).

Constitutions can very much be written to organically self-enlarge

with the passage of time to be made to apply to factual settings then

unknown at the time that Constitution was being written; but our

Founding Fathers in 1787 did not do that.  [664]end


Contemporary technology has very much changed the quiescent HORSE &

BUGGY era and pedestrian highway factual setting our Father's Common

Law grew up on.  [665]


[665] For a recent presentation of what technology will do to trigger

the appearance of Highway regulatory LEX where there had been none

before, a view of PITCAIRN ISLAND in the South Pacific is revealing.

Pitcairn Island is steeped in the allure of intrigue, as it was

colonized by Fletcher Christian and his fellow mutineers from the HMS

BOUNTY in 1790.  It is a British Colony two square miles in area and

is administered by an Island Council under the British High

Commissioner Governor in New Zealand.  For all of Pitcairn's history

up until recent days, only pedestrians and wheelbarrows were even seen

on its highways, but in 1965, things changed.  A heavy Bristol crawler

tractor made its appearance on the Island [see the PITCAIRN MISCELLANY

(the Island newspaper) for January 31, 1965]; and soon that tractor

was followed by a second tractor [id., August 31, 1965].  Within a few

months after the first tractor had arrived, a large number of imported

bicycles were making their appearances, and so now the appearance of

some LEX was imminent for Pitcairn Island:

      "With so many bikes here, traffic rules will be the next new thing

to be introduced here." - Editorial, PITCAIRN MISCELLANY, August 31,


Sure enough, the road LEX soon followed in November, 1965 [id.,

November 30, 1965] by vote of the Island Council.  [665]end


In the old HORSE AND BUGGY days of England, highways were largely dirt

paths acquired from the easement forfeiture from adjoining landowners.

Here in the United States up until the 1940s or so, there was an

extensive network of privately owned toll roads -- Government was just

not "into" highways that much.  In old England, the King never spent

any money on those dirt paths called highways, as there was nothing to

maintain; so when foul weather, even adverse weather lasting across an

entire season made its appearance, then the roads simply ground to a

standstill, and noting moved.  [666]


[666] Back in the old days, when highways became impassable, things

drew to a standstill -- and society literally stopped and occasionally

starved as well:

      "Roads were so bad, and the chain of home trade so feeble, that

there was often scarcity of grain in one part, and plenty in another

part of the kingdom." - ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA under "Corn Laws"

[Cambridge, England (1910)] 11th Edition.  [666]end


But today, Government is spending incredible amounts of money, year in

and year out, to build and maintain highways, so RIGHT TO TRAVEL

argument parallels that folks draw that try to disable the

contemporary ability of the King to even ask for reciprocity back in

return for benefits offered are incorrect -- since in the old days,

the King was not offering a special benefit to begin with (except in

some London streets constructed with cobblestone), and so to say that

the King was once disabled back then from asking for reciprocity when

the King never initially provided any benefits, is an incorrect

parallel built upon disparate factual settings.


And today, high-powered technology routinely causes wholesale death

and destruction when an operator does no more than momentarily lose

absolute mental concentration on driving -- and in such a factual

setting, an honest assessment by Highway Contract Protesters of the

underlying legitimacy of the requirement that there be EVIDENCE OF

COMPETENCY, would necessarily result in the conclusion that a Driver's

License, so called, really isn't all that unreasonable, and is in

fact, very reasonable.  [667]


[667] "We agree that the States have a vital interest in ensuring that

only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles,

that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that

licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being

observed." - DELAWARE VS.  PROUSE, 440 U.S.  648, at 658 (1978).



So it is technology that is responsible for the Prince's Highway LEX,

and not the traffic density congestion that is created from the mere

existence of other people in Society.  [668]


[668] In ancient times, metropolitan cities were frequently heavily

congested with traffic.  Long before the City of Paris leveled entire

neighborhoods to widen some streets in the 1700s, in the First Century

B.C., Julius Caesar banned wheeled traffic (not pedestrians) from the

streets of Rome during peak daylight hours.  The result was that to

some extent the wheeled traffic waited until dusk to use the streets;

pedestrians were free to use the streets during the daylight hours,

causing wheeled vehicles to shift their street congestion into late

night hours [see C.A.J.  Skeel in TRAVEL IN THE FIRST CENTURY AFTER


University Press (1901)].  [668]end


An interesting and very strong argument can be made by your

adversaries, arguing that it would be the failure of the states to

preemptively regulate the highways by licensing that interferes with

your RIGHT TO TRAVEL, since having physiologically incompetent drivers

out on the highways obstructs and interferes with the RIGHT TO TRAVEL

of those other drivers who are competent.  [669]


[669] "...  it has always been recognized as one of the powers and

duties of a Government to remove obstructions from the highways under

its control." - IN RE DEBS, 158 U.S.  573, at 586 (1894).  [669]end


And your adversaries have a truckload full of statistics to support

their line of reasoning.  [670]


[670] "Laws requiring that drivers be licensed and that applicants be

subjected to thorough examination apparently are a more effective

means of reducing accidents." - Note, DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS IN

SPEED LEGISLATION, 46 Harvard Law Review 838, at 842 (1942).

In footnotes 31, 32 and 33, the TRAVELLER'S INSURANCE COMPANY is found

disseminating information on highway traffic accidents back in the

1920s and 1930s; having achieved their important objectives of filling

the Motor Vehicle Statute books full of penal codes, the insurance

companies largely faded away from the scene.  [670]end


Do you see what a difficult corner clever insurance companies have

worked judges into?  Their arguments are logical, and coming up from a

factual setting steeped in the presence of juristic contracts, great

weight will be given to their arguments, no matter how self-serving,

twisted, or vicious they may be.  [671]


[671] Special Interest looters, Tory Aristocrats, and Gremlins,

reigning supreme up and down the corridors of American legislatures,

have been going to work on the meat there since the founding of the


      "That corruption should find its way into the Governments of our

infant republic, and contaminate the very source of legislation, or

that impure motives should contribute to the passage of a law, or the

formation of a legislative contract, are circumstances most deeply to

be deplored." - FLETCHER VS.  PECK, 10 U.S.  87, at 130 (1810).

Here in 1985, the only persons who would actually try and dispute the

presence of looters in American legislatures are those folks who live

most distant from reality, of which there are quite a few, and

collectively they write many books which in turn propagates their

error, which is sometimes intentional.  [671]end


Whenever anyone, regardless of your relational Status off the

highways, uses those Government highways, an invisible contract is in

effect right then and there; it is not necessary for your regional

Prince, the State, to adduce written evidence of your consent -- just

like it is not necessary to get a contract in writing to get the

contract enforced judicially.  [672]


[672] If I am a roofing contractor, and we agree to have me repair

your roof, I don't need any written contract on you at all to throw

MECHANIC'S LIENS on your property, perfect an IN REM Judgment against

your house, and then sell at Foreclosure your own house right out from

underneath you -- without anything having been placed "in writing;" I

do not need your "consent" to get my money out of your house, if you

default on the contract.  A Highway Contract Protester would argue

that since nothing was signed, the contract does not exist; but your

arguments are defective, and you Protesters don't know what you are

talking about.  [672]end


When Protesters get up in the morning, get out the old car, and drive

into the street, they are literally driving themselves into a contract

-- as the Protester then and there accepted benefits conditionally

offered by the State -- no where in your State Constitution does it

require the Prince to build and maintain those Highways of his, so his

building and offering those Highways for your consideration and

possible use is purely discretionary on his part; nor is your Prince

restrained from possessing any expectation of reciprocity from PERSONS

accepting the benefits derived from the use of those Government

Highways.  [673]


[673] Today, regional Princes are calling the shots on Highway

regulatory matters -- tomorrow, the King intends to grab for himself

those Highways.  EXECUTIVE ORDER 11921 ["Adjusting Emergency

Preparedness Assignments..."], largely for use in a POST-WAR scenario,

claims jurisdiction to recover from National Emergencies [See 41

FEDERAL REGISTER 24293 for June 15th, 1976].  Sections 804(4)(b)

["Construction, use and management of highways, streets, and

appurtenant structures..."] to justify this impending Federal grab, as

soon as some emergency can be manufactured.  This EXECUTIVE ORDER

11921 superseded in art, and complemented in part, an earlier

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11940 from the Nixon era [October 28, 1969], that was

designed to justify Federal PRE-WAR seizure of everything.  [673]end


So our Father's old Common Law isn't being contaminated at all by Star

Chamber Traffic Court judges ignoring the fact that no Tort damages

were caused by the criminal defendant, as they go about their work

prosecuting technical infractions to Highway Contracts: Because

neither of the twin Tort indicia of either MENS REA or CORPUS DELECTI

deficiency arguments sounding in the sugar sweet liability vitiating

music of Tort Law that Highway Contract Protesters love to throw at

Traffic Court judges, are not even relevant whenever contracts are up

for review and enforcement -- they never have been, and they never

will be, and the Last Day before Father will not be any exception.



[674] In some States, criminal procedure statutes were written in such

a way that CRIMINAL INTENT was required to be adduced by prosecuting

attorneys under circumstances where contracts are actually in effect.

Patriots who know how to weasel out of traffic prosecutions in those

few States where this legislative rule is in effect, by citing those


PROSECUTIONS, are not correct in associating any prevailing

significance to the existence of those statutes, other than the fact

that, yes, some clown in their legislature once messed up -- just like

legislatures have messed up elsewhere in criminal procedure statutes

in other states.  Those State statutes were written by INTELLIGENTSIA

lawyers -- and so now the degenerate commingling of Tort indicia into

contract infractions by a few states, together with the willful

withholding of the identification of the creation of invisible

contracts when special juristic benefits were quietly accepted out in

the practical setting (benefits carrying regulatory hooks of

lingering reciprocity expectations along with them) by many other

States, is not to be construed as overruling the authenticity of the

information presented herein.  Errors and other enactments

representative of improvident reasoning by legislatures are actually

quite frequent in American legal history; and always remember that

legislatures do not create NATURE -- they never have and they never

will.  [674]end


NOTICE: George Mercier is not affiliated with Freedom School.
NOTICE: If anything in this presentation is found to be in error a good faith effort will be made to correct it in timely fashion upon notification.
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this site relys on this memorandum and others in support of this philosophy and operation.
The noteworthy failure of [the] government or any alleged agency thereof to at any time rebut anything appearing on this website constitutes a legal admission of the fidelity and accuracy of the materials presented, which are offered in good faith and prepared as such by Freedom School and any and all [third] parties affiliated or otherwise. THIS IS AN ELECTRONIC AGREEMENT AND IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT, EQUIVALENT TO A SIGNED, WRITTEN CONTRACT BETWEEN PARTIES - If the government, or anyone else, wants to assert that any of the religious and/or political statements appearing on this website are not factual or otherwise in error, then they as the moving party have the burden of proof, and they must responsively meet that burden of proof under the Administrative Procedures Act 5 U.S.C. §556(d) and under the due process clauses found in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments to the national Constitution BEFORE there will be response to any summons, questions, or unsubstantiated and slanderous accusations. Attempts at calling presented claims "frivolous" without specifically rebutting the particular claim, or claims, deemed "frivolous" will be in deed be "frivolous" and prima facie evidence that shall be used accordingly. Hey guys, if anything on this site is found to be in error a good faith effort will be made to correct it in timely fashion upon notification. is not responsible for content of any linked website or material.
In addition, users may not use to engage in, facilitate or further unlawful conduct; use the service in a way that harms us or anyone connected with or whose work is presented; damage, disable, overburden, or impair the service (or the network(s) connected to the site) or interfere with anyone's use and enjoyment of the website.
All claims to be settled on the land - Austin, Travis county Texas, united States of America, using Texas Common Law.
All parts of this contract apply to the maximum extent permitted by law. A court may hold that we cannot enforce a part of this contract as written. If this happens, then you and we will replace that part with terms that most closely match the intent of the part that we cannot enforce. The rest of this contract will not change. This is the entire contract between you and us regarding your use of the service. It supersedes any prior contract or statements regarding your use of the site. If there exists some manner of thing missing we do not forfeit our right to that thing as we reserve all rights.
We may assign, or modify, alter, change this contract, in whole or in part, at any time with or without notice to you. You may not assign this contract, or any part of it, to any other person. Any attempt by you to do so is void. You may not transfer to anyone else, either temporarily or permanently, any rights to use the site or material contained within.

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