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THE ART OF WAR
by Sun Tzu
Chapter I :
Chapter II :
Chapter III :
Chapter IV :
Chapter V :
Posture of Army
Chapter VI :
Void and Actuality
Chapter VII :
Chapter 1 : Estimates
War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life
or death, the road either to survival or to ruin. Hence, it is imperative
that it be studied thoroughly. Therefore, appraise it in terms of the five
fundamental factors and make comparisons of the various conditions of the
antagonistic sides in order to ascertain the results of a war. The first
of these factors is politics; the second, weather; the third, terrain; the
fourth, the commander; and the fifth, doctrine. Politics means the thing
which causes he people to be in harmony with their ruler so that they will
follow him in disregard of their lives and without fear of any danger.
Weather signifies night and day, cold and heat, fine days and rain, and
change of seasons. Terrain means distances, and refers to whether the
ground is traversed with ease or difficulty and to whether it is open or
constricted, and influences your chances of life or death. The commander
stands for the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence,
courage, and strictness. Doctrine is to be understood as the organization
of the army, the gradations of rank among the officers, the regulations of
supply routes, and the provision of military materials to the army.
These five fundamental factors are familiar to every general.
Those who master them win; those who do not are defeated. Therefore, in
laying plans, compare the following seven elements, appraising them with
the utmost care.
Which ruler is wise and more able?
commander is more talented?
Which army obtains the advantages of
nature and the terrain?
In which army are regulations and instructions
better carried out?
Which troops are stronger?
Which army has the
better-trained officers and men?
Which army administers rewards and
punishments in a more enlightened and correct way?
By means of these
seven elements, I shall be able to forecast which side will be victorious
and which will be defeated.
The general who heeds my counsel is
sure to win. Such a general should be retained in command. One who ignores
my counsel is certain to be defeated. Such a one should be dismissed.
Having paid attention to my counsel and plans, the general must
create a situation which will contribute to their accomplishment. By
"situation" I mean he should take the field situation into consideration
and act in accordance with what is advantageous.
All warfare is
based on deception. Therefore, when capable of attacking, feign
incapacity; when active in moving troops, feign inactivity. When near the
enemy, make it seem that you are far away; when far away, make it seem
that you are near. Hold out baits to lure the enemy. Strike the enemy when
he is in disorder. Prepare against the enemy when he is secure at all
points. Avoid the enemy for the time being when he is stronger. If your
opponent is of choleric temper, try to irritate him. If he is arrogant,
try to encourage his egotism. If the enemy troops are well prepared after
reorganization, try to wear them down. If they are united, try to sow
dissension among them. Attack the enemy where he is unprepared, and appear
where you are not expected. These are the keys to victory for a
strategist. It is not possible to formulate them in detail beforehand.
Now, if the estimates made before a battle indicate victory, it is
because careful calculations show that your conditions are more favorable
than those of your enemy; if they indicate defeat, it is because careful
calculations show that favorable conditions for a battle are fewer. With
more careful calculations, one can win; with less, one cannot. How much
less chance of victory has one who makes no calculations at all! By this
means, one can foresee the outcome of a battle.
Chapter 2 : Waging War
In operations of war - when one
thousand fast four-horse chariots one thousand heavy chariots, and one
thousand mail-clad soldiers are required; when provisions are transported
for a thousand li; when thereare expenditures at home and at the front,
and stipends for entertainment of envoys and advisers-the cost of
materials such as glue and lacquer, and of chariots and armor, will amount
to one thousand pieces of gold a day. One hundred thousand troops may be
dispatched only when this money is in hand. A speedy victory is the main
object in war. If this is long in coming, weapons are blunted and morale
depressed. If troops are attacking cities, their strength will be
exhausted. When the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of
the state will fall short. When your weapons are dulled and ardor
dampened, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, the chieftains of
the neighboring states will take advantage of your crisis to act. In that
case, no man, however wise, will be able to avert the disastrous
consequences that ensue. Thus, while we have heard of stupid haste in war,
we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged. for there has
never been a protracted war which benefited a country. Therefore, those
unable to understand the evils inherent in employing troops are equally
unable to understand the advantageous ways of doing so.
adept in waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts or more
that two provisionings. They carry military equipment from the homeland,
but rely on the enemy for provisions. Thus, the army is plentifully
provided with food.
When a country is impoverished by military
operations, it is due to distant transportation; carrying supplies for
great distances renders the people destitute. Where troops are gathered,
prices go up. When prices rise, the wealth of the people is drained away.
When wealth is drained away, the people will be afflicted with urgent and
heavy exactions. With this loss of wealth and exhaustion of strength, the
households in the country will be extremely poor and seven-tenths of their
wealth dissipated. As to government expenditures, those due to broken-down
chariots, worn-out horses, armor and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and
shields, protective mantlets, draft oxen, and wagons will amount to 60
percent of the total.
Hence, a wise general sees to it that his
troops feed on the enemy, for one zhong of the enemy's provisions is
equivalent to twenty of one's own and one shi of the enemy's fodder to
twenty shi of one's own.
In order to make the soldiers courageous
in overcoming the enemy, they must be roused to anger. In order to capture
more booty from the enemy, soldiers must have their rewards.
Therefore, in chariot fighting when more than ten chariots are
captured, reward those who take the first. Replace the enemy's flags and
banners with you own, mix the captured chariots with yours, and mount
them. Treat the prisoners of war well, and care for them. This is called
"winning a battle and becoming stronger."
Hence, what is valued in
war is victory, not prolonged operations. And the general who understands
how to employ troops is the minister of the people's fate and arbiter of
the nation's destiny.
Chapter 3 : Offensive
Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state
intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy's entire army
is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a
squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in
one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the supreme excellence. Thus, what is of supreme importance in
war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his
alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst
policy is to attack cities.Attack cities only when there is no alternative
because to prepare big shields and wagons and make ready the necessary
arms and equipment require at least three months, and to pile up earthen
ramps against the walls requires an additional three months. The general,
unable to control his impatience, will order his troops to swarm up the
wall like ants, with the result that one-third of them will be killed
without taking the city. Such is the calamity of attacking cities.
Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle.
They capture the enemy's cities without assaulting them and overthrow his
state without protracted operations. Their aim is to take all under heaven
intact by strategic considerations. Thus, their troops are not worn out
and their gains will be complete. This is the art of offensive strategy.
Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to the
enemy's one, surround him. When five times his strength, attack him. If
double his strength, divide him. If equally matched, you may engage him
with some good plan. If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing. And
if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force
is but booty for one more powerful if it fights recklessly.
the general is the assistant to the sovereign of the state. If this
assistance is all-embracing, the state will surely be strong; if
defective, the state will certainly be weak.
Now, there are three
ways in which a sovereign can bring misfortune upon his army:
ignorant that the army should not advance, to order anadvance; or when
ignorant that it should not retire, to order a retirement. This is
described as "hobbling the army."
When ignorant of military
affairs, to interfere in their administration. This causes the officers to
be perplexed. When ignorant of command problems, to interfere with the
direction of the fighting. This engenders doubts in the minds of the
If the army is confused and suspicious, neighboring
rulers will take advantage of this and cause trouble. This is what is
meant by: "A confused army leads to another's victory." Thus, there are
five points in which victory may be predicted:
He who knows when
he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious. He who understands how
to fight in accordance with the strength of antagonistic forces will be
He whose ranks are united in purpose will be
victorious. He who is well prepared and lies in wait for an enemy who is
not well prepared will be victorious. He whose generals are able and not
interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious.
It is in
these five matters that the way to victory is known. Therefore, I say:
Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be
defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your
chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and
of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.
Chapter 4 : Dispositions
The skillful warriors in
ancient times first made themselves invincible and then awaited the
enemy's moment of vulnerability. Invincibility depends on oneself, but the
enemy' vulnerability on himself. It follows that those skilled in war can
make themselves invincible but cannot cause an enemy to be certainly
vulnerable. Therefore, it can be said that, one may know how to win, but
cannot necessarily do so.
Defend yourself when you cannot defeat
the enemy, and attack the enemy when you can. One defends when his
strangth is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant. Those who are
skilled in defense hide themselves as under the nine-fold earth; those in
attack flash forth as from above the ninefold heavens. Thus, they are
capable both of protecting themselves and of gaining a complete victory.
To foresee a victory which the ordinary man can foresee is not the
acme of excellence. Neither is it if you triumph in battle and are
universally acclaimed "expert," for to lift an autumn down requires no
great strength, to distinguish between the sun and moon is no test of
vision, to hear the thunderclap is no indication of acute hearing. In
ancient times, those called skilled in war conquered an enemy easily
conquered. And, therefore, the victories won by a master of war gain him
neither reputation for wisdom nor merit for courage. For he wins his
victories without erring. Without erring he establishes the certainty of
his victory; he conquers an enemy already defeated. Therefore, the
skillful commander takes up a position in which he cannot be defeated and
misses no opportunity to overcome him enemy. Thus, a victorious army
always seeks battle after his plans indicate that victory is possible
under them, whereas an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of
winning but without any planning. Those skilled in war cultivate their
policies and strictly adhere to the laws and regulations. Thus, it is in
their power to control success.
Now, the elements of the art of
war are first, the measurement of space; second, the estimation of
quantities; third, calculations; fourth, comparisons; and fifth, chances
of victory. Measurements of space are derived from the ground. Quantities,
comparisons from figures, and victory from comparisons. Thus, a victorious
army is as one yi balanced against a grain, and a defeated army is as a
grain balanced against one yi.
It is because of disposition that a
victorious general is able to make his soldiers fight with the effect of
pent-up waters which, suddenly released, plunge into a bottomless abyss.
Chapter 5 : Posture of Army
management of a large force is the same as management of a few men. It is
a matter of organization. And to direct a large force is the same as to
direct a few men. This is a matter of formations and signals. That the
army is certain to sustain the enemy's attack without suffering defeat is
due to operations of the extraordinary and the normal forces. Troops
thrown against the enemy as a grindstone against eggs is an example of a
solid acting upon a void.
Generally, in battle, use the normal
force to engage and use the extraordinary forces to win. Now, the
resources of those skilled in the use of extraordinary forces are as
infinite as the heavens and earth, as inexhaustible as the flow of the
great rivers, for they end and recommence - cyclical, as are the movements
of the sun and moon. They die away and are reborn - recurrent, as are the
passing seasons. The musical notes are the passing seasons. The musical
notes are only five in number, but their combinations are so infinite that
one cannot visualize them all. The flavors are only five in number, but
their blends are so various that one cannot taste them all. In battle,
there are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations
are limitless; none can comprehend them all. For these two forces are
mutually reproductive. It is like moving in an endless circle. Who can
exhaust the possibility of their combination?
water tosses boulders, it is because of its momentum; when the strike of a
hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing. Thus, the
momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming, and his attack precisely
timed. His potential is that of a fully drawn crossbow; his timing, that
of the release of the trigger.
In tumult and uproar, the battle
seems chaotic, but there must be no disorder in one's own troops. The
battlefield may seem in confusion and chaos, but one's array must be in
good order. That will be proof against defeat. Apparent confusion is a
product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness,
of strength. Order of disorder depends on organization and direction;
courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength or weakness on tactical
dispositions. Thus, one who is skilled at making the enemy move does so by
creating a situation, according to which the enemy will act. He entices
the enemy with something he is certain to want. He keeps the enemy on the
move by holding out bait and then attacks him with picked troops.
Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation
and does not demand it of his subordinates. He selects suitable men and
exploits the situation. He who utilizes the situation uses his men in
fighting as one rolls logs or stones. Now, the nature of logs and stones
is that on stable ground they are static; on a slope, they move. If
square, they stop; if round, they roll. Thus, the energy of troops
skillfully commanded in battle may be compared to the momentum of round
boulders which roll down from a mountain thousands of feet in height.
Chapter 6 : Void and Actuality
who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease,
and he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary.
And, therefore, those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of
battle and are not brought there by him. One able to make the enemy come
of his own accord does so by offering him some advantage. And one able to
stop him from coming does so by preventing him. Thus, when the enemy is at
ease, be able to tire him, when well fed, to starve him, when at rest to
make him move. Appear at places which he is unable to rescue; move swiftly
in a direction where you are least expected.
That you may march a
thousand li without tiring yourself is because you travel where there is
no enemy. To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the
enemy does not or cannot protect. To be certain to hold what you defend is
to defend a place the enemy dares not or is not able to attack. Therefore,
against those skilled in attack, the enemy does not know where to defend,
and against the experts in defense, the enemy does not know where to
How subtle and insubstantial, that the expert leaves no
trace. How divinely mysterious, that he is inaudible. Thus, he is master
of his enemy's fate. His offensive will be irresistible if he makes for
his enemy's weak positions; he cannot be overtaken when he withdraws if he
moves swiftly. When I wish o give battle, my enemy, even though protected
by high walls and deep moats, cannot help but engage me, for I attack a
position he must relieve. When I wish to avoid battle, I may defend myself
simply be drawing a line on the ground; the enemy will be unable to attack
me because I divert him from going where he wishes.
If I am able
to determine the enemy's dispositions while, at the same time, I conceal
my own, then I can concentrate my forces and his must be divided. And if I
concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a
fraction of his. Therefore, I will be numerically superior. Then, if I am
able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with
will fall into hopeless straits. The enemy must not know where I intend to
give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle, he
must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many
places, those I have to fight in will be few. For if he prepares to the
front, his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be
fragile. If he strengthens his left, his right will be vulnerable, and if
his right, there will be few troops on his left. And when he sends troops
everywhere, he will be weak everywhere. Numerical weakness comes from
having to guard against possible attacks; numerical strength from forcing
the enemy to make these preparations against us.
If one knows
where and when a battle will be fought, his troops can march a thousand li
and meet on the field. But if one knows neither the battleground nor the
day of battle, the left will be unable to aid the right and the right will
be unable to aid the left, and the van will be unable to support the rear
and the rear, the van. How much more is this so when separated by several
tens of li or, indeed, be even a few! Although I estimate the troops of
Yue as many, of what benefit is this superiority with respect to the
outcome of war? Thus, I say that victory can be achieved. For even if the
enemy is numerically stronger, I can prevent him from engaging.
Therefore, analyze the enemy's plans so that you will know his
shortcomings as strong points. Agitate him in order to ascertain the
pattern of his movement. Lure him out to reveal his dispositions and
ascertain his position. Launch a probing attack in order to learn where
his strength is abundant and where deficient. The ultimate in disposing
one's troops is to conceal them without ascertainable shape. Then the most
penetrating spies cannot pry nor can the wise lay plans against you. It is
according to the situations that plans are laid for victory, but the
multitude does not comprehend this. Although everyone can see the outward
aspects, none understands how the victory is achieved. Therefore, when a
victory is won, one's tactics are not repeated. One should always respond
to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways.
Now, an army may
be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and
hastens to the lowlands, so an army should avoid strength and strike
weakness. And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so
an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy.
And as water has no constant form, there are in warfare no constant
conditions. Thus, one able to win the victory by modifying his tactics in
accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine. Of the five
elements [water, fire, metal, wood, and earth], none is always
predominant; of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some
are long and some short, and the moon waxes and wanes. That is also the
law of employing troops.
Chapter 7 : Manuevering
Normally, in war, the general receives his commands from the
sovereign. During the process from assembling his troops and mobilizing
the people to blending the army into a harmonious entity and encamping it,
nothing is more difficult than the art of maneuvering for advantageous
positions. What is difficult about it is to make the devious route the
most direct routeand divert the enemy by enticing him with a bait. So
doing, you may set out after he does and arrive at the battlefield before
him. One able to do this shows the knowledge of the artifice of diversion.
Therefore, both advantage and danger are inherent in maneuvering for an
advantageous position. One who sets the entire army in moriton with
impediments to pursue an advantageous position will not attain it. If he
abandons the camp and all the impediments to contend for advantage, the
stores will be lost. Thus, if one orders his men to make forced marches
without armor, stopping neithe day nor night, covering double the usual
distance at a stretch, and doing a hundred li to wrest an advantage, it is
probable that the commanders will be captured. The stronger men will
arrive first and the feeble ones will struggle along behind; so, if this
method is used, only one-tenth of the army will reach its destination. In
a forced march of fifty li, the commander of the van will probably fall,
but half the army will arrive. Ina forced march of thirty li, just
two-thirds will arrive. It follows that an army which lacks heavy
equipment, fodder, food, and stores will be lost. One who is not
acquainted with the designs of his neighbors should not enter into
aliances with them. Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and
forests, hazardous defiles, marshes and swamps, cannot conduct the march
of an army. Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain the
advantages of the ground. Now, war is based on deception. Move when it is
advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and
concentration of forces,. When campainging, be swift as the wind; in
leisurely marching, majestic as the forest; in raiding and plundering, be
fierce as fire; in standing, firm as the mountains. When hiding, be as
unfathomable as things behind the clouds; when moving, fall like a
thunderbolt. When you plunder the countryside, divide your forces. When
you conquer territory, defend strategic points. Weigh the situation before
you move. He who knows the artifice of diversion will be victorious. Such
is the art of manuevering.
o See translation from the Chinese by LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910)
o See Complete Chinese text with hyper-links to its English translation by LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1996)
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