Money, Credit & Banking Memorandum


Original (Dec. 3, 1999)

by Dan Meador
(Dan passed away in November, 2003)


This original memorandum was constructed as part of a pleading to be filed in the near future. It treats credit, money, banking, and the disability of state judgments relating to these matters.

Contrary to prohibitions in Article I § 10 of the Constitution of the United States, the defendants, as officers of the court and otherwise, charge fees, impose fines, sanctions and other penalties, make monetary awards, and accommodate federally chartered and/or regulated financial institutions in mediums other than gold and silver coin of the UnitedStates. They thereby defy the law of the land, and in so doing, compromise sovereignty and solvency of the People of Kay County and Oklahoma. Collectively, these acts constitute perjury, as defined by Article XV §2 of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, and otherwise constitutecriminal acts.

Article I § 8, clauses 5 & 6 of the U.S. Constitution impose duties on Congress: "[The Congress shall have Power] To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin.., [and] To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States."

Article I § 10 ¶ 1 then establishes prohibitions against theStates:

Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation … coin Money; emit Billsof Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts…

There has been no amendment to the Constitution of the United States altering or abolishing obligations of Congressenumerated in Article I § 8, or prohibitions against States of the Union in Article I § 10. It follows that Oklahoma public servants cannot issue, and certainly cannot traffic in or enforce private bills of credit, or otherwise burden or penalize the People of Oklahoma through alternative credit and monetary schemes prohibited by Article I § 10 ofthe U.S. Constitution. Yet via what amounts to unconstitutional legislation, the Oklahoma Legislature has consented to, or directly entered agreements adopting credit-based monetary schemes.

In the Uniform Commercial Code, at 12A Okla. Stat. 1-201(24), the definition of "money" that governs all current financial transactions in Oklahoma is as follows:

(24) "Money" means a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government and includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental organization or by agreement between two or more nations.

The second significant factor in this obviously unconstitutional scheme is "credit", as defined in the Oklahoma Consumer Credit Code at 14A Okla. Stat. § 1-301(7):

(7) "Credit" means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.

The "credit" definition above duplicates the definition of credit in the Federal Consumer Protection Act at 15 U.S.C. § 1602.

The definitions of "money" and "credit" provide a context for the general fraud: The definition of "money" at 12AOkla. Stat. § 1-201(24) is contrary to and prohibited by Article I § 10 of the Constitution of the United States, and "credit";, as defined at 14A Okla. Stat. § 1-301(7), is prohibited by Article I § 10 of the U.S. Constitution as States of the Union cannot authorize or enforce what they themselves are prohibited from doing. Congresshas no constitutionally delegated authority to authorize private bills of credit, or substitute currency other than that prescribed by the U.S. Constitution. By virtue of explicit prohibitions at Article I § 10, States of the Union cannot accommodate either the money alternatives or the "credit" instrument which colorably endorses or extends consent and authority to defer payment rather than pay debt.

On a different subject, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the effect of the separation of powers doctrine, and the prohibition against States of the Union accommodating exercise of federal powers not enumerated in the Constitution, in New York v. United States, 505 U=2ES. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), at pp. 2431-2432:

The answer follows from an understanding of the fundamental purpose served by our Government's federal structure. The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereigntyis not just an end in itself: "Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). "Just as the separation and independence ofthe coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk oftyranny and abuse from either front." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 458. See The Federalist No. 51, p. 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state officials. An analogy to the separation of powers among the branches of the Federal Government clarifies this point. The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), for instance, the Court heldthat Congress had infringed the President's appointment power, despite the fact that the President himself had manifested his consent to the statute that caused the infringement by signing it into law. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 842, n.12. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.919, 944-959, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), we held that thelegislative veto violated the constitutional requirement that legislation be presented to the President, despite Presidents' approval of hundredsof statutes containing a legislative [**2432] veto provision. See id., at 944-945. The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expandedby the "consent" of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States.

State officials thus cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. Indeed, the factsof these cases raise the possibility that powerful incentives might leadboth federal and state officials to view departures from the federal structure to be in their personal interests. Most citizens recognize the need for radioactive waste disposal sites, but few want sites near their homes. As a result, while it would be well within the authority of either federal or state officials to choose where the disposal sites will be, it is likely to be in the political interest of each individual official to avoid being held accountable to the voters for the choice of location. If a federal official is faced with the alternatives of choosing a location or directing the States to do it, the official may well prefer the latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision. If a state official is faced with the same set of alternatives -- choosing a location or having Congress direct the choice of a location -- the state official may also prefer the latter, as it may permit the avoidance of personal responsibility. The interests of public officials thus may not coincide with the Constitution's intergovernmental allocation of authority. Where state officials purport to submit to the direction of Congress in this manner, federalism is hardly being advanced.

Nor does the State's prior support for the Act estop it from assertingthe Act's unconstitutionality. While New York has received the benefit of the Act in the form of a few more years of access to disposal sites in other States, New York has never joined a regional radioactive waste compact. Any estoppel implications that might flow from membership in a compact, see West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 35-36, 95 L. Ed.713, 71 S. Ct. 557 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring), thus do not concernus here. The fact that the Act, like much federal legislation, embodies a compromise among the States does not elevate the Act (or the antecedentdiscussions among representatives of the States) to the status of an interstate agreement requiring Congress' approval under the Compact Clause. Cf. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 572, 10 L. Ed. 579 (1840) (plurality opinion). That a party collaborated with others in seeking legislation has never been understood to estop the party from challenging that legislation in subsequent litigation.

Although state and federal courts ignore and otherwise accommodate fiat credit and monetary systems, the principles Justice O’Connor recited in New York v. United States are just as applicable to mandates and prohibitions relating to gold and silver coin and bills of credit in Article I §§ 8 & 10 as they are to any other state or federal authority. The various "money" units endorsed by 12AOkla. Stat. § 1-201(24), and "credit" endorsed at 14A Okla. Stat. 1-301(7), are patently unconstitutional. Even if Oklahoma is party to an intergovernmental agreement that endorses anything other than gold and silver coin as a tender for payment of debt, the agreement can be of no lawful effect, with or without congressional endorsement. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the matter conclusively in United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560, 13 L.Ed. 257, at 261:

If the medium which the government was authorized to create and establish could immediately be expelled, and substituted by one it neither created, estimated, nor authorized &emdash;; one of no intrinsic value &emdash; then the power conferred by the Constitution would be useless, wholly fruitless of every end it was designed toaccomplish. Whatever functions the Congress are, by the Constitution authorized to perform, they are, when the public good requires it, bound to perform; and on this principle, having emitted a circulating medium, a standard of value, indispensable for the purposes of the community, and forthe action of the government itself, they are accordingly authorized andbound in duty to prevent its debasement and expulsion, and the destruction of the general confidence and convenience, by the influx and substitution of a spurious coin in lieu of the constitutional currency.

Under Article I § 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has a duty to provide gold and silver coin as the national currency; under of Article I § 10, the several States are prohibited from minting coin, emitting bills of credit, or making anything but gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt. Neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Oklahoma Constitution vest Congress or the Oklahoma Legislature with power to grant blanket authority to defer payment of debt or endorse private bills of credit as a medium of exchange. Therefore, the Uniform Commercial Code and the Consumer Credit Code are patently unconstitutional, and all acts of state officials which endorse, enforce, or otherwise accommodate credit and money alternatives accommodated by the acts are void. An unconstitutional act is void from its inception; it does notcreate rights, benefits or obligations, and it does not afford immunity for those who act under what amounts to color of law.

The question, of course, is how the current state of affairs came to pass, and how accommodating mechanics were implemented. Reviewing the emergency act enacted in special session of Congress on March 9, 1933 is a good place to begin.

The legislation put forth that day was House Resolution 1491, the final legislation published beginning at 48 Stat. 1. At the onset, the Act declares, "That the Congress hereby declares that a serious emergency exists and that it is imperatively necessary speedily to put into effect remedies of uniform national application."

Title I, Section 1 of the act affirms emergency orders issued by President Roosevelt on or after March 4, 1933, "pursuant to the authorityconferred by subdivision (b) of section 5 of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, are hereby approved and confirmed."

The act referred to is the Trading With the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, H.R. 4960, 40 Stat. 411. The purpose of the act was, "To define,regulate, and punish trading with the enemy…" The term "enemy" is defined in Section 2:

Sec. 2. That the word "enemy," as used herein, shall be deemed to mean, for the purposes of suchtrading and of this Act &emdash;
Any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals, of any nationality, resident within the territory (including that occupied by the military and naval forces) of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside the United States and doing business within such territory, and any corporation incorporated within such territory of any nation with which the United States is at war or incorporated within any contry other than the United States and doing business within such territory.
The government of any nation with which the United States is at war, or any political or municipal subdivision thereof, or any officer, official, agent, or agency thereof.
Such other individuals, or body or class of individuals, as may be natives, citizens, or subjects of any nation with which the United States is at war, other than citizens of the United States, wherever resident or wherever doing business, as the President, if he shall find the safety ofthe United States or the successful prosecution of the war shall so require, may, by proclamation, include within the term "enemy."

The 1933 amendment was to Section 5(b) of the Act, the original as follows (40 Stat. 415):

(b) That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreignexchange, export or ear-markings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the production of any books of account,contracts, letters or other papers, in connection therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is completed.

The 1933 amendment is in Section 2 of the act of March 9, 1933:

Sec. 2. Subdivision (b) of section 5 of the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. L. 411), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"(b) During time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenseor otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by banking institutions as defined by the President, and export, hoarding, melting, or ear-marking of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, by any person within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof; and the President may require any person engaged in any transaction referred to in this subdivision to furnishunder oath, complete information relative thereto, including the production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is completed…

While the act of March 9, 1933 amended 67; 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, it did not amend the object of the Act, the object being an enemy as defined in § 2 of the original act, nor did it amend or repeal mandates and prohibitions of Article I§§ 8 & 10 of the U.S. Constitution. As states in In Re: Powell, 602 P.2d 711 (1979), Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. vs. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933), and numerous other cases, no emergency justifies override or suspension of the Constitution, so this amendment, which appears to have universal application throughout the nation, was either patently unconstitutional, as suggested in Senate Report No. 93-549, or it has a more restrictive application than meets the eye.

The key phrase in the amended § 5(b) is, "…by any person within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof…"

The amended § 5(b) did and does apply to the "geographical"; United States, which includes the District of Columbia and territories and insular possessions of the United States.

Application is clarified by the definitions in Title II § 202 of the Act, Title II being the "Bank Conservation Act."

Sec. 202. As used in this title, the term "bank" means (1) any national banking association, and (2) any bank or trust company located in the District of Columbia and operating under the supervision of the Comptroller of the Currency; and the term "State" means any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, and the Canal Zone.

Variations of the "State" definition are found throughout the United States Code. States of the Union are not States of the United States, as such; States of the United States include the District of Columbia, and insular possessions of the United States, today including Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Until 1946, the Philippines was an insular possession of the United States, and until they were admitted as States of the Union, Alaska and Hawaii were "States of the United States." Names of territories and insular possessions following "States of the United States" demonstrate the class of "Federal"; State by example.

One of the better examples that distinguishes between "States of the United States" and the Union of several States is the venue and jurisdiction section of the criminal code, at 18 U.S.C. § 3231:

§ 3231. District courts
The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.
Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof.

It is necessary to go to Rule 54(c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to determine application of an "Act of Congress", and the term "State":

"Act of Congress" includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.
"State" includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.

The first sentence of 18 U.S.C. § 3231 gives district courts of the United States jurisdiction exclusive of territorial courts; the second preserves laws and judicial authority of theseveral States within their respective jurisdictions.

This maze shouldn’t be necessary if Congress acted uniformly under Article I delegated powers. However, Congress, and federal government as a whole, is schizophrenic: The United States has restricted authority relative to States of the Union, but has permissive authority over territory belonging to the United States. In the first instance, Congress may exercise only powers enumerated by the Constitution; in the second, Congress may exercise any power not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Where the several States are concerned, Congress may not delegate universalpower to the President, as the emergency bill of March 9, 1933 did (New York v. United States, supra) where insular possessions ceded by Spain following the Spanish-American War (1898) have been under military or quasi-military authority from the onset. In territorial courts of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, judicial process has always proceeded in the name and by authority of the, "United States of America, ss, President of the United States." (See applicable sections in Title 48 ofthe United States Code)

In practice, the amended § 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Actand the Bank Conservation Act, along with other New Deal legislation that eventually prohibited the American people from owning gold, was imposedthroughout the nation. However, the legislation itself was always applicable to the geographical United States subject to Congress’ plenary power, not the Union of several States. Each step of the way, it was up to state governments to accommodate federal incursion that amounted to gross usurpation of power.

A bit of history helps to understand the scheme: Congress established two national banks in the first few decades after convening government ofthe United States under the Constitution. The charter of the first was revoked when international bankers who owned it drove the fledgling nationinto debt that threatened survival. In 1836, President Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill that would have renewed the charter of the second national bank, thereby putting an end to that one for the same reason the charter of the first was terminated. President Jackson’s rationale was simple: The Constitution does not authorize Congress to establish a national bank or even corporations. Those powers, per the Tenth Amendment, are reserved to the States, respectively.

The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which authorized the Federal Reserve System and privately owned Federal Reserve regional banks, was primarily a territorial act. The Federal Reserve banks serve as "fiscal agent" of the United States, managing financial affairs of United States Government in its intragovernmental capacity, and legitimately engages in lending activity only in the geographical United States subject to Congress’ municipal authority.

Once this scheme was in place, the balance of federal government had to follow. By the time the first edition of the United States Code was produced in 1926, Congress had for all practical purposes abandoned Article I § 8 delegated authority and had moved virtually all legislation toterritorial authority. Officers of the several States, whether intentionally or through ignorance, moved a considerable distance with respect to accommodation prior to 1929, then for all practical purposes capitulated with the advent of New Deal legislation in 1933 and after.

The "Cooperative Federalism" side of the Federalism scheme (Fabian Communism) was formalized by delegates of state and local government via the Declaration of Interdependence of the Governments within the United States of America in Common Council, signed January 22, 1937at the third general assembly of the Council of State Governments (Book of the States, Vol. 2, Book II, pp. 143-144).

As noted elsewhere, the U.S. Supreme Court condemned original legislation that would have imposed a national social welfare system (RailroadRetirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758 (1935)), so when the Social Security Act was finally enacted, it was applicable only in territories and insular possessions of the United States (See definitions of "State", "United States", and "citizen" at 26 CFR § 31.3121(e)-1). Yet at the third general assembly of the Council of State Governments, "Interstate Cooperation Under the Social Security Act" was one of the major agenda issues (pp. 133-134), along with other key elements of the New Deal social welfare program.

The illusion here, however, is that most accommodating legislation by state governments, as is the case for "normal tax" and the like, is intragovernmental legislation. That is, it applies to state officersand employees, not the general population. This is exemplified by 51 Okla. Stat. § 125, which authorizes political subdivisions of state government to contract for employee Social Security coverage:

Cite As: 51 O.S. § 125 (OSCN1999)
Title 51. Officers
Chapter 4
§125. Plans for Coverage of Employees of Political Subdivisions and of State and Local Instrumentalities.
(a) Each political subdivision of the state and each instrumentality of the state or of a political subdivision is hereby authorized to submit for approval by the state agency a plan for extending the benefits of Title II of the Social Security Act, in conformity with applicable federal law,to employees of any such political subdivision or instrumentality. If not precluded by applicable federal law and under such conditions as the state agency may by regulation prescribe, two or more such political subdivisions or instrumentalities may, for the purposes of this act, form a joint coverage unit and as such submit for approval a joint plan if otherwise, because of the requirements of the agreement entered into pursuant to Section 123 or because of the requirements imposed by or under applicable federal law, any subdivision or instrumentality included in such unit would be unable to submit an approvable plan. Each such plan or any amendment thereof shall be approved by the state agency if it finds that such plan, or such plan as amended, is in conformity with such requirements as are provided in regulations of the state agency, except that no such plan shall be approved unless:
(1) It is in conformity with the requirements of the applicable federal law and with the agreement entered into under Section 123;
(2) It provides that all services which constitute employment as defined in Section 122 and are performed in the employ of the political subdivision or instrumentality, or in the employ of any member of a joint coverage unit submitting the plan, by any employees thereof, shall be covered by the plan, provided that the plan may exclude from its coverage any services which, under the provisions of that section, are excluded from the term "employment" when so specified in a plan, except that it may exclude services performed by individuals to whom Section 218(d)
(3) (C) of the Social Security Act is applicable;
(3) It specifies the source or sources from which the funds necessary to make the payments required by paragraph (1) of subsection (c) and by subsection (d) are expected to be derived and contains reasonable assurance that such sources will be adequate for such purpose;
(4) It provides for such methods of administration of the plan by the political subdivision or instrumentality or members of the joint coverage unit as are found by the state agency to be necessary for the proper and efficient administration of theplan;
(5) It provides that the political subdivision or instrumentality or members of the joint coverage unit will make such reports, in such form and containing such information, as the state agency may from time to time require, and comply with such provisions as the state agency or the federal agency may from time to time find necessary to assure the correctness and verification of such reports; and
(6) It authorizes the state agency to terminate the plan in its entirety or, in the discretion of the state agency, as to any member of a joint coverage unit, if it finds that there has been a failure to comply substantially with any provision contained in such plan, such termination to take effect at the expiration of such notice and on such conditions as may be provided by regulations of the state agency and be consistent with applicable federal law.
(b) The state agency shall not finally refuse to approve a plan submitted under subsection (a), and shall not terminate an approved plan, without reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing to each political subdivision or instrumentality affected thereby.
(c) (1) Each political subdivision or instrumentality as to which a plan has been approved under this section shall pay into the Contribution Fund,with respect to wages (as defined in Section 122 of this title), at such time or times as the state agency may by regulation prescribe, contributions in the amounts and at the rates specified in the applicable agreement entered into by the state agency under Section 123.
(2) Every political subdivision or instrumentality required to make payments under paragraph (1) of this subsection is authorized, in consideration of the employee's retention in,or entry upon, employment after enactment of this act, to impose upon its employees, as to services which are covered by an approved plan, a contribution with respect to wages (as defined in Section 122 of this title), not exceeding the amount of the employeetax which would be imposed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act if such services constituted employment within the meaning of that Act, and to deduct the amount of such contribution from the wages as and when paid. Contributions so collected shall be paid into the Contribution Fund in partial discharge of the liability of such political subdivision or instrumentality under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Failure to deduct such contribution shall not relieve the employee or employer of liability therefor.
(d) Delinquent payments due under paragraph (1) of subsection (c) may,with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, be recovered by action in a court of competent jurisdiction against the political subdivisionor instrumentality liable therefor or may, at the request of the state agency, be deducted from any other monies payable to such subdivision or instrumentality by any department or agency of the state.
Historical Data
Added by Laws 1949, p. 377, § 5, emerg. eff. June 1, 1949. Amended by Laws
1955, p. 280, § 5, emerg. eff. June 6, 1955.

The "public money" link via federally chartered and/or regulated financial institutions is best demonstrated by accounts insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, per 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(2)(A):

(2)(A) Notwithstanding any limitation in this chapter or in any other provision of law relating to the amount of deposit insurance available for the account of any one depositor, in the case of a depositor who is &emdash;
  1. an officer, employee, or agent of the United States having official custody of public funds and lawfully investing or depositing the same in time and savings deposits in an insured depository institution;
  2. (ii) an officer, employee, or agent of any State of the United States, or of any county, municipality, or political subdivision thereof havingofficial custody of public funds and lawfully investing or depositing the same in time and savings deposits in an insured depository institution in such State;
  3. an officer, employee, or agent of the District of Columbia having official custody of public funds and lawfully investing or depositing the same in time and savings deposits in an insured depositoryinstitution in the District of Columbia;
  4. an officer, employee, or agent of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, of the Virgin Islands, of American Samoa, of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of Guam, or of any county, municipality, or political subdivision thereof having official custody of public funds and lawfully investing or depositing the same in time and savings deposits in an insureddepository institution in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or Guam, respectively; or
  5. (v) an officer, employee, or agent of any Indian tribe (as defined insection 1452(c) of title 25) or agency thereof having official custody of tribal funds and lawfully investing or depositing the same in time and savings deposits in an insured depository institution; such depositor shall, for the purpose of determining the amount of insured deposits under this subsection, be deemed a depositor in such custodial capacity separateand distinct from any other officer, employee, or agent of the United States or any public unit referred to in clause (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v).
  6. and the deposit of any such depositor shall be insured in an amount not to exceed $100,000 per account in an amount not to exceed $100,000 peraccount. (FOOTNOTE 1)
    (FOOTNOTE 1) So in original. The second occurrence of the phrase ''inan amount not to exceed $100,000 per account'' probably should not appear.
FDIC insures only deposits of "public money," and as demonstrated by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(2)(A) and 31 CFR § 202.1, only officers and employees of United States Government and political subdivisions of the United States are entitled to receive and use public money. In fact, the controlling definition of "State" which prescribes territorial jurisdiction of FDIC at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(3) provides oneof the most inclusive lists of "States of the United States":
  1. (3) State. - The term ''State'' means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, any territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
Oklahoma and other States of the Union accommodate the fraud via assorted adopted uniform acts such as authorization for state agencies and instrumentalities to contract Social Security benefits for employees of the state and its political subdivision, but regardless of state legislation, the federal agency has no right or lawful authority to enter such contracts unless Congress has specifically authorized them. The definition of "State" above clearly demonstrates the geographical limits Congress has imposed, regardless of how willing state and local government officials are to enter such contracts. So far asthe Union of States is concerned, Congress cannot exercise a power not enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, and the several States, either unilaterally or by agreement, cannot accommodate an exercise of federal power not enumerated in the Constitution, per New York v. United States, supra. Where the federal social welfare system and "public money"; are concerned, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander: Article I § 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the several States from emitting bills of credit, or making anything but gold and silver coina tender for payment of debt.
The geographical limitation on federal departments, agencies, et al, is positive, not passive. Congress built a legal fence around them via legislation now classified at 4 U.S.C. §§ 71 & 72:
Sec. 71. Permanent seat of Government
All that part of the territory of the United States included within the present limits of the District of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United States. (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 643)
Sec. 72. Public offices; at seat of Government
All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expresslyprovided by law. (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 643)
The federal entity, whether the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the Department of Agriculture, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or federally chartered enterprises such as national banks and federal savings and loan associations, are subject to territorial as well as subject matter limitation. As demonstrated by definitions of "State", "United States", and "citizen" at 26 CFR § 31.3121(e)-1, the Social Security Administration is geographically limited to territory of the United States, including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has approximately the same geographical limits, and it has "subject matter" jurisdiction limited to "public money." While the State of Oklahoma participates in federal social welfare and public money schemes, it does so under colorof law. The department or agency officer who enters agreements with States of the Union and their respective political subdivisions is "outlaw", operating beyond limits of law. If the arrangement accommodatesa federal power not enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, which is the case for federal social welfare and public money schemes, the contractual arrangement and all accommodating acts are void. Alexander Hamilton set this principle out in Federalist Paper No. 78:
There is no position which depends on clearer principle than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above the master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.
To further demonstrate fraud effected via the banking system, it is useful to review the context of federal law responsible for their creation and various functions: To begin, national banks, federal savings and loans, federal credit unions, and other such entities are chartered as associations. They are not incorporated to operate with open-door policy the way retail merchants do. The original charters authorize them to provide basic banking services such as checking accounts for qualified association members. Those qualified to be association members are officers and employees of United States Government and political subdivisions of the UnitedStates. They traffic exclusively in public money, which only officers and employees of U.S. Government and its political subdivisions are entitled to receive and use. (See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(2)(A), supra, and 31 CFR § 202.1)
In order to do anything besides cash checks, provide checking accounts, and provide other basic services, the financial institution must apply and be certified as a Treasury tax and loan depositary (31 CFR §§; 202 & 203). Once qualified in this capacity, they operate as fiscal agents of the United States. As fiscal agents, they can provide a variety of services for United States Government and its various political subdivisions. One function is to serve as a medium for transmission of federal grants to qualified recipients. Another is to provide tax trust accounts for government agencies required to withhold and pay normal tax and other taxes in Subtitles A, B & C of the Internal Revenue Code. They may also serve in the capacity of withholding agent for governmental entities required to pay normal tax and the various federal social welfare taxes.
In order to engage in lending activity, the financial institution mustapply and be certified as one of several kinds of special banks. For example, any given national bank, qualified "State" bank [SIC], savings and loan, etc., may function as a Federal Home Loan Bank, Intermediate Credit Bank, Farm Credit Bank, etc. However, whenever the financial institution operates in any of these capacities, it leaves its associationcapacity behind, and functions as an agency of United States Government.It is classified as a mixed-ownership government corporation, per 31 U.S.C. § 9101:
Sec. 9101. Definitions
In this chapter &emdash;
(1) ''Government corporation'' means a mixed-ownership Government corporation and a wholly owned Government corporation.
(2) ''mixed-ownership Government corporation'' means
  1. Amtrak.
  2. the Central Bank for Cooperatives.
  3. the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
  4. the Federal Home Loan Banks.
  5. the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks.
  6. the Federal Land Banks.
  7. the National Credit Union Administration Central Liquidity Facility.
  8. the Regional Banks for Cooperatives.
  9. the Rural Telephone Bank when the ownership, control, and operation of the Bank are converted under section 410(a) of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 950(a)).
  10. the United States Railway Association.
  11. the Financing Corporation.
  12. the Resolution Trust Corporation.

    (M) the Resolution Funding Corporation.

    (3) ''wholly owned Government corporation'' means &emdash;
  13. the Commodity Credit Corporation.

    (B) the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund; (FOOTNOTE 1)

(FOOTNOTE 1) So in original. The semicolon probably should be a period.


  1. the Export-Import Bank of the United States.
  2. the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.
  3. Federal Prison Industries, Incorporated.
  4. the Corporation for National and Community Service.
  5. the Government National Mortgage Association.
  6. the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
  7. the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation.
  8. the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
  9. the Rural Telephone Bank until the ownership, control, and operation of the Bank are converted under section 410(a) of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 950(a)).
  10. the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation.
  11. the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development when carrying out duties and powers related to the Federal Housing Administration Fund.
  12. the Tennessee Valley Authority. (N) (FOOTNOTE 2) the Uranium Enrichment Corporation.
(FOOTNOTE 2) So in original. Probably should be ''(O)''.
Virtually all lending by financial institutions companies that issue credit cards, is made under auspices of mixed-ownership or wholly-owned government corporations. As the medium in transaction accounts is "public money", credit the mixed-ownership government corporation issues is hypothecated on credit of the United States. In one way or another, whether directly or through wholly-owned government insurance corporations, United States Government underwrites all financial institution credit transactions.


This is made clearer when considering the definition of the term "credit", which on the federal side appears in Regulation Z (12 CFR § 226.2(14)):
(14) Credit means the right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.
This definition is essentially the same asthe definition of credit at 14A Okla. Stat. § 1-301(a)(7):
(7) "Credit" means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.
A question resolves what might appear to be a dilemma: Does private enterprise have power to grant authority to defer payment of debt, or to incur debt then defer payment? Hardly. Only government has theoretical authority to grant such power, but Article I § 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits States of the Union from emitting bills of credit, which necessarily prohibits them from authorizing private enterprise to emit bills of credit, and it prohibits them from makinganything but gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt. Consequently, "credit" issued via mixed-ownership government corporations, and underwritten by wholly-owned government corporations, comes by way of United States Government, it is an intragovernmental benefit extended only to officers and employees of the United States and its political subdivisions (the geographical United States). The United States is at alltimes principal of interest. The financial institution merely provides agent or agency services. Operating as a Federal Home Loan Bank, a FederalIntermediate Credit Bank, or whatever, the financial institution initiates credit transactions and services accounts, but the United States remains principal of interest, and is responsible for collecting delinquent accounts. The financial institution has no private or independent right of action for collection of delinquent or defaulted accounts.


Federal authority relative to "credit" extends to virtually all contemporary financial institutions, including credit card companies,as evidenced by the definition of "creditor" at 12 CFR § 226(a)(17):
(17) Creditor means (I) A person (A) who regularly extends consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written agreement in more than 4 installments (not including a down payment), and (B) to whom the obligation is initially payable, either on the face of the note or contract, or by agreementwhen there is no note or contract.
Congress further locked the matter down at 31 U.S.C. § 9102 by stipulating that mixed-ownership government corporations (lending banks of various sorts) can be established or acquiredonly under law of the United States:
Sec. 9102. Establishing and acquiring corporations
An agency may establish or acquire a corporation to act as an agency only by or under a law of the United States specifically authorizing the action.
(Pub. L. 97-258, Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1042.)
The lending institution, operating in a federal agency capacity, exists by virtue of, and must comply with all federal statutory and regulatorymandates and prohibitions. Therefore, it is not subject to state law in its lending capacity. In its original capacity, it may provide basic financial services for qualified association members only; as a Treasury tax and loan depositary, it functions as fiscal agent of the United States for purposes specified by law; and when it qualifies as a lending institution, if functions as a mixed-ownership government corporation in an agencycapacity. It may originate and service credit transactions. The credit transactions are hypothecated on credit of the United States, and the United States is at all times principal of interest.


In the event of delinquency or default, the "employer" of the "employee" (See definitions of "employee" at 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c ), and "employer" at § 3401(d)) is responsible for presenting the claim and negotiating a payment agreement (See 5 U.S.C. §§ 5510-5520a generally; see § 5513 relating tocompromise and installment payment agreements). In the event the employee fails or refuses to pay, the General Accounting Office, which is general agent of the Treasury of the United States (Act of June 10, 1921, ch. 18, title III, 42 Stat. 23), is required to determine liability, then turnthe matter over to the Attorney General, in his capacity as Solicitor ofthe Treasury, for litigation (5 U.S.C. § 5512):
Sec. 5512. Withholding pay; individuals in arrears
(a)The pay of an individual in arrears to the United States shall be withheld until he has accounted for and paid into the Treasury of the United States all sums for which he is liable.
(b) When pay is withheld under subsection (a) of this section, the General Accounting Office, on request of the individual, his agent, or his attorney, shall report immediately to the Attorney General the balance due; and the Attorney General, within 60 days, shall order suit to be commenced against the individual.
Per 28 U.S.C. § 1345, litigation for collection of debt must be commenced in a district court of the United States:
Sec. 1345. United States as plaintiff
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress.
By virtue of the "arising under" clause at Article III §; 2 ¶ 1 of the U.S. Constitution, courts of the United States have jurisdiction exclusive of courts of the several States:
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority…
Litigation must proceed in accordance withfederal debt collection procedure prescribed in Chapter 176 of Title 28 of the United States Code, §§ 3001 et seq.


It has been customary for Oklahoma courts and courts of other States of the Union to accommodate financial institution foreclosures and the like, but all such judgments are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the following reasons: (1) As a State of the Union, Oklahoma cannotemit bills of credit, which necessarily precludes endorsing and enforcing private bills of credit; (2) Oklahoma and other States of the Union cannot make anything but gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt; (3) courts of the United States have original and exclusive jurisdiction under authority of the "arising under" clause at Article III § 2 ¶ 1 of the U.S. Constitution, and by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1345; and (4) the financial institutions are operating under color of authority and contrary to laws of the United States.


Here again, Congress implemented a couple of safety valves: The Privacy Act and the Paperwork reduction Act impose disclosure requirements on all information-gathering forms. The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) requires all information-gathering forms to inform whomever is asked to complete the form, including credit applications and the like, if information requested on the form is voluntary, mandatory, or necessary to secure or retain a benefit.


Regulations for the Paperwork reduction Act provide what amounts to a silver bullet (5 CFR § 1320.6):
§ 1320.6 Public protection.
a. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information that is subject to the requirements of this part if:
1. The collection of information does not display, in accordance with §1320.3(f) and § 1320.5(b)(1), a currently valid OMB control number assigned by the Director in accordance with the Act; or
2. The agency fails to inform the potential person who is to respond to the collection of information, in accordance with § 1320.5(b)(2), that such person is not required to respond to the collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.
a. The protection provided by paragraph (a) of this section may be raised in the form of a complete defense, bar, or otherwise to the imposition of such penalty at any time during the agency administrative process in which such penalty may be imposed or in any judicial action applicable thereto.
Privacy Act and Paperwork reduction Act notice requirements prescribe necessary elements to be displayed on all information-gathering forms. This is as much a requirement on financial institutions operating as agentsof United States Government as particulars prescribed for currency, postage stamps, money orders or any other security or negotiable instrument issued under auspices of U.S. government authority. Where the institution fails to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements, it utters bogus and counterfeit securities under color of authority of the United States. In sum, it engages in criminal enterprise. This is the reason 5 CFR § 1320.6(b) provides a complete defense against administrative or judicial remedies that can be raised at any time, including after the fact. The credit transaction predicated on an application which fails to complywith Privacy Act and Paperwork reduction Act regulations has the character of counterfeit money and securities. If and when a counterfeit dollar or security is discovered, the person responsible for issuing it has civil and criminal liability. Further, he has no lawful remedy for collectionor execution.


This matter is relevant as credit applications from all manner of financial institutions have been examined, and to date, none have complied with Privacy Act and Paperwork reduction Act disclosure mandates.


The Uniform Commercial Code, the Oklahoma Consumer Credit Code, and other such adopted acts, suppose to accommodate suppose to accommodate monetary units other than gold and silver coin, and generally speaking, accommodate enforcement of private bills of credit, both of which are prohibited by Article I § 10 ¶ 1 of the U.S. Constitution. Beyond that,federally chartered and/or regulated financial institutions exist and conduct business by virtue of and within a preexisting body of federal law which necessitates compliance with federal statutory and regulatory mandates and prohibitions. Governments of the several States, Oklahoma included, have absolutely no authority to enlarge or alter functions of these institutions in their respective capacities as mixed-ownership government corporations and agents of United States Government.


At Article XXIII §§ 8 & 9, the Oklahoma Constitution voids all contracts, and notice and demand instruments, which seek to abridge, avoid or otherwise compromise constitutional mandates and prohibitions:
§ 8. Contracts waiving benefits of Constitution invalid
Any provision of a contract, express or implied, made by any person, by which any of the benefits of this Constitution is sought to be waived, shall be null and void.
§ 9. Notice or demand, stipulation for
Any provision of any contract or agreement, express or implied, stipulating for notice or demand other than such as may be provided by law, as a condition precedent to establish any claim, demand, or liability, shallbe null and void.

Aside from constrains of federal law, prohibitions of Article I §10 of the U.S. Constitution are preserved by Article XXIII §§ 8 & 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution, above. Private bills of credit, whether in the form of the private scrip Federal Reserve Note or some other token currency, the "public money" scam common to bank transaction accounts, or contracts that create obligations to be discharged by "deferred payment" through ledger-entry debits that have absolutely no substance and do not constitute consideration of value, are uniformly condemned. Notice and demand predicated on these frauds is likewise condemned, both declared void the law of the land in Oklahoma.


Judgments of Oklahoma courts that have accommodated financial institutions operating under color of authority of the United States are void forlack of subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of Article I § 10 andArticle III § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and Article I § 1 ofthe Oklahoma Constitution. Under Oklahoma conflict of law doctrine (75 Okla. Stat. § 12), original acts, including constitutions of Oklahomaand the United States, in all cases prevail.



The more I looked at Jim Prentice's question concerning "credit", and my response, the more I was convinced the piece would make a good 4-page handout to give people who aren't familiar with "patriot" issues. Consequently, I spent time I didn't have editing and adding to the piece. It is attached in HTML.
In Word for Mac, 12 pt. Times, with 6 point spacing between paragraphs, it fits comfortably on four pages. For 20 cents or less for each copy, you can have something to blanket the neighborhood with. You might want to take a few to your favorite bank to see if the chief executive officer would like to distribute them. Or see if your Congressman, or even your local judge, would like to share what skunks they are.
Dan Meador
How the Credit System is Destroying America
By Dan Meador
Jim Prentice of Miami, Florida responded to a memorandum on banking, credit and money that I transmitted over Internet with a request for clarification. His request relates to the definition of "credit" found in the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act and corresponding state consumer acts. In approximate terms, both define "credit" as the grant of authority to defer payment of debt, or to incur debt then defer its payment.
This is what the banking system does: When a bank extends credit, it authorizes people not to pay debt. Instead of paying debt, the obligation is deferred by giving bank credit to whoever provides goods and services. Credit changes hands, not money.
While increasing numbers are beginning to understand how this scheme is destroying the nation, too many don't grasp how the system works or why it is destroying America. One of the problems is the technical language used to explain the system. Another is that nobody has stated the case in a short composition most any literate person can easily understand. My response to Jim was reasonably lucid, so it is being reproduced for general distribution.
Jim's query follows this introduction, then my explanation follows his query. The response has been slightly expanded.
Jim Prentice Query
Hi Dan.
I have had a somewhat difficult time explaining what is meant by the phrase "incur debt and defer its payment". I believe I understand it to mean that payment is made with debt which is passed along from one to another which appears to be payment but is in reality the passing of "IOU'S". A 'check' is a promise to pay, Federal Reserve Notes are for all practical purposes IOU'S and are not in fact payment. Unless "Payment" is tendered in legal money, gold or silver, payment is not made and that which has been purchased has not lawfully been paid for. Therefore, ownership is not free and clear, or allodial.
Please correct my understanding if I am wrong or off point. Possibly you can write a much clearer definition or explanation.
Thanks for your time and god bless.
Dan Meador Response
To understand the "defer payment" nonsense, suppose I am in the banking business. You open an account with me. You come in one day needing cash, and my cashier tells you, "We haven't printed our money yet, but we're specially marking bills out of a Monopoly game. I'll give you some of that stuff. You tell merchants you spend it with that we will give them credit when they bring it back to us."
Obviously, nothing is paid. The medium of exchange is scrip, or put another way, token money. It has no intrinsic or inherent value. Whoever agrees to accept it for goods and services agrees to take my "credit" in lieu of payment.
Next month you tell me you want to buy a house. You need to borrow a hundred thousand dollars. That's fine, I tell you, so I get you to sign a mortgage, using the house as security, then write out a check to you or whoever you make the purchase from. Probably I "credit" your account with whatever you want to borrow. To me, and you, the "credit" is simply a ledger entry effected by writing the sum in the debit column of my accounts book, and a corresponding figure in the credit column of your account. You then write the check to the seller, thereby putting my "credit" into circulation.
What is the check? It is a "bill of credit." There is nothing of substance behind it other than the house. In other words, if the scheme works, you and the seller have invited me to "monetize" the house. The seller must then peddle my credit in order to make other purchases. The only thing of value other than the house is your sweat equity, the returns you receive from whatever service or product you provide in order to earn a living.
In order to implement this scheme, I bribe government officials to take all real money out of circulation so everyone is dependent on my Monopoly money and credit. Nobody ever really pays a debt because there is nothing to pay it with. I impose healthy charges for issuing credit (loan origination fees, account service fees, and interest), and the Monopoly money I circulate is purchased from profits from the credit scheme. The Monopoly money costs next to nothing because it has no stand-alone value. When the scheme finally collapses, you can use it to light your cigars.
There are two adverse general effects. First, we're dealing with arbitrary monetary value, so as I infuse the system with credit, denominated in Monopoly money amounts, the current price of goods and services constantly inflates, thereby devaluing the purchasing power of existing checking accounts, passbook savings accounts, retirement life insurance polices, and labor. In other words, the purchasing power of your sweat equity and your productive enterprise is debased.
This is a musical chairs game played out in real life. The reason is this: I don't lend credit necessary to pay interest. Therefore, the system never has enough money for everyone to make essential purchases such as food, shelter and clothing, pay debt principal, and make interest payments. Those on the short end of the rope are forced into default by foreclosure, abandonment or bankruptcy liquidation. The farmer, small business owner, independent craftsman, independent merchant, and labor are all ravaged by the scheme. This has an unavoidable consolidation effect. As those on the short end of the rope are liquidated, the scavenger scoops up everything of value at bargain basement prices. This pressure is behind consolidation of major corporations over the last two decades. The big fish eat the little ones until there are no little ones left, then they eat each other. In the meantime, American production and working classes are being driven down the economic ladder to third world status.
In order to stave off domestic rebellion, the banking community cuts deals with elected and appointed public servants. First, we're going to give the system elasticity by making increasingly large loans in order to expand monetary supply, thereby slowing down the liquidation process. We have to do this to accommodate unavoidable inflation. Second, we will get our government shills to implement a social welfare program that provides a subsistence floor for those victimized by our fraudulent credit and monetary schemes. Government, of course, will tax the people to pay for the social welfare program. The greatest tax burden will be levied on middle income classes. Key players will be relatively unaffected by the tax scheme. We'll sell this plan based on the notion that "preservation of capital" is essential. Private borrowing will be supplemented by government borrowing, so government, which serves as the ultimate social welfare program, must continuously expand to compensate for the broadside of private enterprise.
Home mortgages presently monazite approximately 70% of the nation's monetary system. Precious few Americans have outright ownership of homes. Government borrowing has escalated sufficiently that interest on cumulative federal debt exceeds a quarter of a trillion dollars per year. If government legitimately balanced the budget, the American economy would collapse. The system is as dependent on constant infusion of hypothecated government credit as a heroine addict is to the opium poppy.
The credit-based system is somewhat like the wheel the hamster has in his cage. In this case, however, once someone gets started on it, he can't get off. Since a vast majority of the American people are in invisible credit cages, everyone is running the banker's wheel.
We see the same kind of hocus-pocus in judgments against tobacco companies. Were they required to outright pay milti-billion dollar judgments? No, they are simply increasing the price of tobacco products so consumers pay the judgments out over time. Whether via increased government "sin" taxes or judgments against private corporations, the consumer is being taxed. The first is a legislative excise tax; the second is a judicial excise tax. The conglomerate, multinational tobacco company continues business as usual. It hasn't been forced to empty its coffers or liquidate anything.
Banks constantly pass on "inflation" tax that undermines sovereignty and solvency of the nation. The effect of interest on real wealth is like the supernova black hole. Nothing caught in its gravitational sphere of influence can escape.
The scheme is condemned by Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. States of the Union cannot emit bills of credit or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt. Since they are prohibited from emitting bills of credit, it is obvious that they do not have authority to endorse and enforce private bills of credit.
Prior to convening the Constitutional Convention, American founders were confronted with the same thing we're dealing with today. Many of the newly independent American states were issuing bills of credit that they couldn't and wouldn't redeem. Speculators made out like bandits while common classes were reduced to pauper status. Trade was disrupted, and base industries destabilized. This is the reason Article I, Sec. 10 of the Constitution sets out specific prohibitions concerning credit and money. None of the prohibitions have been amended or repealed. They remain in full force.
Accommodation of the mathematically impossible credit and money schemes is accomplished by what is described as color of law. It is appearance of law only.

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